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SPECIFIC RELIEF FOR ANCIENT 
DEPRIVATIONS OF PROPERTY 
Shelby D. Green∗ 
July 1998: “The Wiljen tribe in Western Australia staked a claim to 
13.2 million square kilometres of Antarctica.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1795, the State of New York purchased more than 64,000 acres 
of land from the Cayuga Indian Nation for roughly $2,000, plus a small 
annual annuity.2  Two centuries later, a federal court would declare that 
sale void because it violated a federal law.3  But what relief should be 
granted?  Rescission of contract? Ejectment of the current possessors?  
Early in the litigation, the court ruled that specific relief, that is, the 
return of the land, would not be granted, that the Cayuga would have to 
accept instead a substitutionary relief, monetary compensation.4  Even 
monetary compensation would prove a difficult calculation if 200 years 
of interest would be added in.  In all, the state was ordered to pay a sum 
far greater than the meager original purchase price, indeed, more than a 
quarter of a billion dollars.5  There will be more such reckonings in the 
State of New York and nationwide,6 as the Oneida Indian Nation is also 
 
∗Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, J.D. Georgetown University Law 
Center, B.S. Towson State College. 
 1 “Aborigines Lay Claim to Antarctica,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 25, 1998, available 
at http://www.lexis.com. 
 2 Cayuga Indian Nation of N. Y. v. Pataki, 165 F. Supp. 2d 266, 332 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).  In 
subsequent transactions, the State of New York acquired tribal lands for four shillings, or the 
equivalent of fifty cents, per acre, which the state in turn sold by public auction at two dollars per 
acre.  Id. at 331. 
 3 Indian Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. §177 (2002). 
 4 Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, Nos. 80-CV-930; 80-CV-960, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
10579 (N.D.N.Y. June 30, 1999). 
 5 Cayuga Indian Nation, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 283.  The amount awarded included $211 
million as prejudgment interest.  Id. at 366. 
 6 Through negotiated settlements since 1970, the United States has restored to Native 
Americans more than a half billion acres of land.  See Nell J. Newton, Compensation, Reparations, 
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seeking to recover some 270,000 acres in two New York counties7 and 
the Senecas are claiming title to some 19,000 acres making up the 
Niagara Islands.8  Last year, to the probable, though perhaps short-lived, 
relief of the State of Illinois and many individual landholders, the Miami 
Tribe of Oklahoma voluntarily dismissed, without prejudice, a complaint 
seeking to reclaim more than 2.6 million acres.  They alleged that their 
original and ancient title to the land continued after European 
colonization because it was never extinguished by, nor ceded to, the 
federal government.9  One of the largest land claims brought against the 
federal government was won by the Sioux Nation in 1980 on the basis of 
a claim that the Black Hills of South Dakota had been taken a century 
earlier in breach of treaty.10  But the citizens of the Sioux Nation have 
refused the monetary award, insisting instead on the return of the land.11 
The claim to Antarctica seemed only the next logical assertion of 
 
& Restitution: Indian Property Claims in the United States, 28 GA. L. REV. 453 (1994). 
 7 Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974) (“Oneida I”).  This case 
was first dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the complaint 
essentially alleged a state claim to possession.  Oneida Indian Nation v. Oneida, 464 F.2d 916 (2d 
Cir. 1972).  The Supreme Court reversed [in the cite above], holding that a claim to possession 
based on Indian title presented a question of federal law.  Oneida I, 414 U.S. at 682.  On remand, 
the district court held for the plaintiffs.  Oneida Indian Nation v. Oneida, 434 F. Supp. 527, 548 
(N.D.N.Y. 1977).  The Second Circuit rejected defendants’ claims that there was no private right of 
action under the Nonintercourse Act or an action at federal common law.  Oneida Indian Nation v. 
Oneida, 719 F.2d 525, 544 (2d Cir. 1983), aff’d, 470 U.S. 226.  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and affirmed the Second Circuit in Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 253-54 
(1985) (“Oneida II”).  In September 2000, the district court denied the Oneida’s request for leave to 
amend their complaint to add ejectment, Oneida Nation v. Oneida, 199 F.R.D. 61 (N.D.N.Y. 2000), 
essentially on the ground that for most of the litigation, the Oneida had represented that they would 
not seek ejectment, where they had not originally.  Id. at 86. 
 8 Seneca Nation of Indians v. New York, 26 F. Supp. 2d 555 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).  In Seneca 
Nation of Indians v. New York, 206 F. Supp. 2d 448 (W.D.N.Y. 2002), the court rejected an attempt 
by the Senecas to reclaim land consisting of the Niagara Islands that had been transferred in 
violation of federal law by finding that their aboriginal title had been extinguished before the 
alleged unlawful transfer.  In Alabama-Coushatta Tribe v. United States, No. 3-83, 1996 U.S. 
Claims LEXIS 128, at *265 (July 22, 1996), the court ruled that the government was liable to pay 
full monetary compensation to the plaintiff tribe for breach of the government’s fiduciary duties in 
failing to prevent the taking of the tribe’s aboriginal lands, some 3.5 million acres in southeastern 
Texas.  Id.  The tribe had only sought monetary compensation and not the return of the land.  Id. at 
*269. 
 9 Miami Tribe v. Walden, 206 F.R.D. 238, 239 (S.D. Ill. 2001).  Intervening on the side of 
current possessors, Senator Peter G. Fitzgerald had introduced legislation to give aid to “certain 
Illinois families and landowners seriously threatened” by the suit.  Fitzgerald Bill Aids Illinois 
Families Named in Indian Lawsuit, PR NEWSWIRE, July 25, 2000 available at 
http://www.lexis.com. 
 10 United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). 
 11 Sioux Nation is discussed further infra, at note 165 and accompanying text.  The monetary 
award remains in the federal treasury and stands at nearly half a billion dollars.  See generally, 
DAVID GETCHES ET. AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 361 (4th ed. 1998). 
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title by Australian aboriginals, given their recent successes at reclaiming 
title to native lands in Australia.  Last year alone, they reclaimed more 
than 90,000 square miles of land.12  As of July 2000, there were more 
than 500 aboriginal land claims pending, covering half of the state’s 
crown land.13 
In the last two years, by negotiated treaty and settlement, Canada 
has restored indigenous groups to hundreds of thousands of square miles 
of aboriginal land, including “old-growth forests, beach fronts and 
mountainsides” on beautiful Vancouver Island.14 The Nunavut 
Agreement15 is the largest land claims agreement in the world, covering 
some 350,000 square kilometres, including some 36,000 square 
 
 12 Roger Martin, Land title deal a bonanza for 500 Aborigines, AUSTRALASIAN BUSINESS 
INTELLIGENCE, Oct. 17, 2000, available at 2000 WL 28459263.  In October, 2000 “the Spinifex 
people of Western Australia have won Australia’s largest land rights claim . . . [o]ver 50,000 square 
kilometres of land in the Great Victoria Desert, . . . representing 85 per cent of their traditional 
lands.”  Id.  In October 2000, a federal court “handed down [a] negotiated determination that [gave] 
the Wik and Wik Way people exclusive rights [to] over 6,000 square kilometres of land and inland 
waters on the Western edge of the Cape York Peninsula.”  Cathy Pryor, New struggle looms after 
Wik people win six-year land battle, AUSTRALASIAN BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE, Oct. 4, 2000, 
available at 2000 WL 27948080. In August 2000, an agreement was reached on the “claim by the 
Nganawongka for 48,000 kms of pastoral country south of the Pilbara.  The claim gave access to 
pastoral leases for hunting, fishing and other non-commercial purposes and compensation for 
mining.”  Ron Brunton, Landmark native title agreement an eye-opener, AUSTRALASIAN BUSINESS 
INTELLIGENCE, Dec. 9, 2000, available at http://www.lexis.com.  In August 2000, a federal court in 
Perth, granted “native title” over an area of 47,607 square kilometres in Western Australia’s 
Murchison-Gascoyne region, restoring to them “native title” rights over it, which included the right 
to hunt, fish and gather. 
 13 There were 194 claims in Queensland, 141 in Western Australia, 86 in New South Wales, 
67 in the Northern Territory, 26 in South Australia, 21 in Victoria, three in the Australian Capital 
Territory, and none in Tasmania).  It was reported that such native title claims were costing the 
Victoria government some $3 million a year.  AAP Information Services, Pty. Ltd. Nationwide 
General News, Australian General News, “Vic: Native Title Claim Costs Hit $3 million Per Year.”  
June 4, 1999, available at http://www.lexis.com.  In an examination of recent statistics regarding 
land claims, one writer estimated that Aborigines have potential claims to seventy-nine percent of 
Australia’s land.  Gilda C. Rodriguez, Note, Wik Peoples v. State of Queensland: A Restrained 
Expansion of Aboriginal Land Rights, 23 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 711, 724 (1998). 
 14 Anthony DePalma, Canada and British Columbia’s Largest Indian Group Taking Steps to 
First Permanent Treaty”, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001.  In March 2001, Canada and British 
Columbia’s largest Indian group, the Nuu-chah-nulth, entered into a historic treaty that gave the 
Indians self-rule, $152 million and shared control with non-Indians over almost 260 square miles.  
Id.  In June 2000, Canada agreed to pay the indigenous Squamish Nation “$92.5 million to settle 
claims to former reserves in Vancouver, North Vancouver and Squamish.”  “Ottawa pays B. C. 
Band $92.5 to settle claims to former reserves [Squamish], CANADIAN BUSINESS AND CURRENT 
AFFAIRS, June 9, 2000. 
 15 The agreement was signed on May 25, 1993, forming the Agreement Between the Inuit of 
the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty the Queen in the Right of Canada.  Nunarut Land 
Claims Agreement Act, ch. 29, S.C. 1993 (Can). The federal implementation legislation is Nunavut 
Land Claims Agreement Act, ch.29, S.C. 1993 (Can.).  It received royal assent on June 10, 1993 and 
became effective by order in council on July 9, 1993.  Id. 
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kilometres with subsurface rights and exclusive or preferential game 
rights to particular species of wildlife, and monetary compensation of 
more than a billion dollars payable over 14 years.16 
In these cases, there are the broad claims for the return of ancestral 
lands.  There are also the more narrow ones for specific rights, such as to 
fish, hunt, mine, forest, and whale, as these are thought to inhere in title 
in the western conception of ownership and are said to be an aspect of 
aboriginal title that can be exercised unconnected to a specific parcel of 
land.  There have even been claims to water as a species of aboriginal 
rights.17 
In virtually all of these cases, both the rights and the claims being 
asserted are ancient. The rights are ancient in the formal sense of being 
pre-modern and founded upon or grounded in ancient, common, or 
customary law.  The claims are ancient in the formal sense of having 
arisen in antiquity or centuries ago when the taking or dispossession 
occurred.18  They are also ancient in the legal sense of otherwise being 
subject to or barred by statutes of limitations. But as the recounted 
successes show, the rights and claims, though ancient, are yet viable and 
qualify for relief under prevailing property law theory. 
Nations have responded variously to these claims, by establishing 
land claims commissions to acquire land from current possessors for the 
return to indigenous peoples,19 adopting constitutional amendments to 
 
 16 As part of the agreement, the federal government committed itself to a process to create 
the new territory of Nunavut on April 1, 1999. 
 17 In the Philippines, claims for the restoration of “ancestral domain,” have included 
ancestral lands, forests, inland waters, coastal areas, natural resources and land for traditional access 
used by the groups for their subsistence and traditional activities.  Luz Rimban, Philipines: Legal 
Claim Opens Doors for Indigenous Islanders, INTER PRESS Service, Oct. 1, 1988, available at 
http://www.lexis.com; The indigenous Tagbanua people established title not only to more than 
22,000 hectares of land, but also to ancestral waters, the blue-green waters of the Coron Island in 
the Palawan province in central Philippines.  Id.  In Yarmirr v. Northern Territory, 2001 Aust. High 
Ct LEXIS 51 (Oct. 11, 2001), the Australian High Court rejected a claim by aboriginals to the seas 
and seabeds contained within aboriginal areas, including reefs, on the ground that under common 
law, an exclusive right to waters in individuals was inconsistent with the public right to navigate and 
to fish the waters.  Id. at *90, *94. 
 18 In the Republic of South Africa, as of 1998, some 64,000 land claims had been lodged 
under the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994 for the return of land taken from black South 
Africans under the apartheid regime.  Peter Wilhelm, “Rolling of Huge Boulder Begins to Gain 
Pace * Land Restitution”, FINANCIAL MAIL, May 14, 1999, available at http://www.lexis.com. 
 19 E.g., Philipines—The Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997, Republic Act No. 8371 
(1997). (Since 1994, the Philippines’ environment department has awarded well over a hundred 
“Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claim”); Brazil—National Land Reform and Colonization 
Institute in Brasilia; Malaysia—(Some 30,000 applications per year have been filed to resolve 
ancestral land issues).  See A. Yogeshwary, Increase in number of ancestral land cases, NEW 
STRAITS TIMES, Mar. 24, 2001.  Since 1974, 600,000 of such cases have been resolved.  Id.; See 
4
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protect aboriginal rights and provide for compensation in case of a 
taking of native lands,20 enacting land rights acts that declare and define 
indigenous land rights,21 negotiating settlements,22 and entering into 
treaties.23  Many aboriginal rights claims in the United States are being 
prosecuted in the courts.24 
Indigenous peoples in North America and Australia state a claim 
even though their interest in the soil first occupied by them was not 
formally recognized as a “property” interest until centuries after the 
coming of the Europeans.  For centuries after that, it was difficult  to 
discern a coherent theory of their aboriginal title.  Aboriginal title or 
“original Indian title,” as it is referred to in the United States, is not fee 
simple title with all the usual empowering incidents.  By the 
presumption of European sovereignty, aboriginal title is an inalienable 
right of occupancy, liable to extinguishment by the national sovereign, 
but immune from many of the burdens of fee simple title, such as state 
taxation and state powers of eminent domain.  But why is aboriginal title 
so limited and vulnerable to sovereign prerogative while fee simple title 
is not?  The difference between these types of title is not organic or 
intrinsic, that is, appertaining to the nature of the thing over which the 
claimant asserts rights.25  In fact, aboriginal title has only to do with who 
 
also, Zimbabwe—The Land Acquisition Act of 1992 (Zimbabwe); Chile—Corporacion Nacional de 
Desarrollo Indigena (“Conadi”)  (six years ago in Chile, the government has begun the process of 
acquiring ancestral lands for the eventual conveyance to indigenous communities.  See “Rights 
Claims in Chile,” Nov. 22, 1999, by Gustavo Gonzalez). 
 20 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) (Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada), § 
35(1); In the Republic of South Africa, the newly-adopted Constitution provides for government  
expropriation of private property so long as it is in accordance with law (E.g., for public purposes or 
in the public interest) and subject to compensation.  S. AFR. CONST. (1996) ch.II (Bill of Rights), § 
25.  The Constitution also provides for legislative action to implement land reform.  Id.  Under 
Section 25(7), “[a] person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 [Native Land 
Act of 1913] as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent 
provided by an Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress.”  Id. § 
25(7).  Section 25(6) provides that “[a] person or community whose tenure of land is legally 
insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided 
by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure, or to comparable redress.”  Id. at § 
25(6).  The Lands Claim Court was established in 1996 and hears claims from the Commission on 
the Restitution of Land Rights, which mediates land claims arising from the forced removals after 
the enactment of the 1913 Act.  If mediation fails to successfully resolve a claim, it is referred to the 
Land Claims Court for adjudication.  Among other things, the Land Claims Court can order 
restitution to successful claimants in the form of land or other remedies, for which the state bears 
the burden of compensation. 
 21 Native Title Act of 1993 (Austl.) (establishing the National Native Title Tribunal). 
 22 See discussion supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 23 See discussion supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 24 See cases mentioned at text accompanying notes 7 through 9. 
 25 There are numerous instances in the Western concept of property where whether there is 
5
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its original holders are. It can only exist in indigenous peoples as a 
group, but cannot be created in them from fee simple title.  Aboriginal 
title is title that was so designated and excluded from the common law 
property system. While a system evolved to mark the contours and 
dimensions of fee simple title and to provide remedies for its fulfillment, 
that system generally was not available to holders of aboriginal title and 
no other system or scheme was quick to emerge to remedy infringements 
of aboriginal rights. For centuries, aboriginal claimants were left to 
appeal to the mercy of courts of equity and the grace of Congress for 
protection and redress of infringements.26  But as the claims have found 
legal forums and as indigenous peoples have found political clout, the 
challenge for the courts has been to fashion just remedies for 
infringements to a kind of right that is of a wholly different order, and 
where the protection of which presents ancientness never allowed in the 
case of fee simple title. 
I consider in this paper the extent to which courts rationally and on 
a principled basis can deny to aboriginal claimants, despite the 
ancientness of their claims, the specific relief of being restored to 
possession of their aboriginal lands where the case for such specific 
relief is otherwise made.  The paper begins with a brief discussion of the 
foundations of property in the Western conception, then goes on to 
discuss the Europeans’ asserted title to indigenous lands and the various 
theories of aboriginal title that have emerged.  It then explores the past 
and existing legal obstacles to the judicial resolution of the indigenous 
peoples’ claims and concludes with the proposition that unless the 
federal government intervenes to create new sovereign territory in 
substitution of aboriginal lands, specific relief is compelled.  That is to 
say, the only just and legally sustainable substitutionary relief is 
substitute land.  The paper’s main focus is on aboriginal land claims in 
the United States, with some discussion of claims in Canada and 
Australia. 
II.  FIRST POSSESSION AND PROPERTY IN THE COMMON LAW 
Foremost in the Western European canon is that property resulted 
 
property or not depends on the character of the things in which property rights are sought.  Claims 
to property in human body parts have been resisted. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Ca., 793 P.2d 
479 (Cal. 1990). One state has declared elk not eligible for private ownership (Wyoming) and no 
one can monopolize ideas. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (West 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN 
§ 23-1-103 (West, WESTLAW through 2002 Legis. Sess.). 
 26 See discussion infra. 
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from first possession.27 According to Blackstone “occupancy is the thing 
by which . . . title was in fact originally gained; every man seizing . . . 
such spots of ground as he found most agreeable to his own 
convenience, provided he found them unoccupied by any one else.”28  It 
is a theory that is venerable and persistent, dating back to Roman law.29  
While Blackstone’s articulation has in the forefront  notions of 
territoriality and might, others have proposed that private property was 
necessitated by scarcity, that is, as consumption in common led to the 
scarcity of the natural riches of the earth, private property became 
necessary to preserve peace.30 Through explicit agreement and 
agreement implied by occupation, it became understood that whatever a 
person had taken possession of should be that person’s property.31 
John Locke built upon the first possession theory by incorporating 
aspects of natural law.  He posited that property resulted from mixing 
one’s labor with objects belonging to no one.32  This is because, as a 
principle of natural law, we indisputably “own” ourselves and, by 
extension, everything we produce.33  Self-preservation thus required the 
 
 27 See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 73-88 
(1985). 
 28 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *8-9.  This was so 
by the law of nature and reason that in the beginning, “he, who first began to use it, acquired therein 
a kind of transient property, that lasted so long as he was using it, and no longer: or, to speak with 
greater precision, the right of possession continued for the some time only that the act of possession 
lasted.”  Id. at *2-3.  It later “became necessary to entertain conceptions of more permanent 
dominion; and to appropriate to individuals not the immediately use only, but the very substance of 
the thing to be used.  Otherwise innumerable tumults must have arisen, and the good order of the 
world been continually broken and disturbed, while a variety of persons were striving who should 
get the first occupation of the same thing, or disputing which of them had actually gained it. . . .”  
Id. at 4. 
 29 LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 49 (1977). 
 30 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 8. 
 31 JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 14 (Little, Brown & Co. Ltd. (3d ed. 
1993); see also RICHARD SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 130-31 
(1951). “Despite its persistence, the normative case for first possession—its force as a 
justification—is commonly thought to be rather weak.”  Dukeminier at 15.  Other equally logical 
bases for property include need, on the one hand, and efficiency on another.  There is also the 
rationale of social utility.  For a general discussion of the theories of property, see Jeremy Waldron, 
What is Private Property?, 5 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 313, 318 (1985); Becker, supra note  29; 
STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY (1990); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988). 
 32 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 20 (Prometheus Books 1986) 
(1690). 
 33 Id. at 22.  Locke’s theory has been described as “a philosophy of property that justif[ied] 
private ownership not as a means for capitalist accumulation but as a means for withstanding the 
abuse of authority by government.”  Bradley Bryan, Property as Ontology: On Aboriginal and 
English Understandings of Ownership, 13 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 3, 10-11 (2000). 
7
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recognition and protection of those things thus resulting from one’s labor 
and one’s dominion.34  According to Hume, rules of property are 
conventions that have evolved spontaneously, arisen gradually and 
acquired force by slow progression and repeated experience.35 
One modern conception of property, “conflates [it] with wealth, or 
rather, with . . . ‘goods’ and ‘items of consumption.’”36  Property as such 
has lost its distinct moral difference such that the idea of ‘use’ (acts of 
dominion or adding labor) as fundamental, is now based primarily in its 
exchange value.37  Even though the avowed meaning of property is the 
right that characterizes a particular relationship between an individual 
and the rest of society, the varieties of relationships have increasingly 
become transactional in nature.  In this sense, the social relationships 
and moral understandings that had previously undergirded property 
theory have since been rationalized and structured according to the 
demands of production.38  
The homily of the common law, though, is that possession is the 
root of title.39  But what does it mean to possess?  Posession includes a 
clear act, some sort of statement, or a declaration of one’s intent to 
appropriate.  That act must give notice to the world that the possessor 
has appropriated the property.40  Professor Rose writes that the requisite 
 
 34 Locke offered his theory of property before the industrial revolution.  In the views of one 
scholar, “[t]he kinds of changes that happen[ed] in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, properly 
understood, alter[ed] the nature of property rights through their application to industrial enterprise, 
and hence can be best understood through the analysis of the development of contract law and of the 
law of remedies for trespass.”  Id. at 12.  Property thus acquires an exchange value.  Id. 
Such a transformation in English property law speaks volumes of how we understand our 
own relationship to the natural world.  Specifically, what something is is not determined 
by who owns it but rather by what it is worth. This is reflected in the modern practice of 
property law: as property is really (crudely) a bundle of rights, these rights reflect the 
abilities one has with respect to what one can do with one’s property, and usually this is 
reflected in contractual or succession arrangements of one sort or another . . . .  The ‘use’ 
value of a thing disappears because property becomes understood in terms for which it 
can be bargained, i.e., in contract. 
Id. at 12-13. 
 35 2 DAVID HUME, TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 273-84 (T.H. Green & T.H. Grose eds., 
London, Longmans, Green & Co. 1874). 
 36 Bryan, supra note 33, at 14. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id.  As we discuss infra, however, aboriginal title, since it cannot be voluntarily 
exchanged, continues to have only “use” value. 
 39 “Occupancy has long been regarded as the basis for original title to territory by the law of 
nature, and hence in international law.”  KENT MCNEIL, COMMON LAW ABORIGINAL TITLE 135 
(1989); A.W. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW (Clarendon Press, 1986); Rosalie Schaffer, 
International law and sovereign rights of indigenous peoples, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
ABORIGINAL HUMAN RIGHTS 19-42 (Barbara Hocking, ed., 2d. 1988).’’ 
 40 See generally, I. F. Pollock & R.S. Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law 
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act must make a statement, meaning that “acts of possession” are a 
“text,” and “the common law rewards the author of that text.”41  But the 
clearest text may have ambiguous subjects and it is inevitable that the 
interpretation and meaning of “text” and “subjects” will be read 
differently by different audiences and depending upon the readers’ 
ultimate objectives or interests.42  There is also the doubtful proposition 
that “there is such a thing as a ‘clear act,’ unequivocally proclaiming” to 
the world at large that one is appropriating that any relevant audience 
will naturally and easily interpret as a property claim.”43  Yet in defining 
the acts of possession that makeup a claim to property, the law not only 
rewards the author of the “text;” it also puts an imprimatur on a 
particular symbolic system and on the audience that uses this system.44 
III.  INVENTIONS AND FICTIONS FOR TITLE 
Henry Maine defined “fiction” in law as “any assumption which 
conceals or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law has undergone 
alteration, its letter remaining unchanged, its operation being 
modified.”45  In the workings of the law, fictions serve to introduce 
change behind the facade of adherence to existing law.46  Lon Fuller 
wrote of several motivations behind the use of fictions: First, policy, that 
is, to conceal something from others, particularly that judges do not 
make law, but only declare what has always been law;47 second, 
emotional conservatism, that is, as a way of satisfying the judge’s own 
craving for certainty and stability; third, convenience, by making use of 
existing legal institutions by pretending that certain facts exists; and 
fourth, intellectual conservatism, where the judge does not know how 
else to state and explain the new principle he is applying.48  Fuller 
explained that legal fiction probably owes it origin “not so much to a 
 
16 (1888) (“possession in law” is “the fact of control coupled with a legal claim and right to 
exercise it in one’s own name against the world at large, . . . not as against all men without 
exception.”) 
 41 Rose, supra note 27, at 82. 
 42 Id. at 83.  Rose states: “[But] it is not always easy to establish a symbolic structure in 
which the text of first possession can be ‘published’. . .  Some objects of property claims [indeed] 
seem inherently incapable of clear demarcation [altogether]—ideas, for example. [note omitted].”  
Id. 
 43 Id. at 84. 
 44 Id. at 85. 
 45 HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 25 (4th ed. 1906). 
 46 DIAS, supra note 47, at 318; R.W. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE, 408 (2d ed. 1964). 
 47 DIAS at 319, citing MAINE at 38.  See generally, DIAS, supra note 47, at 407-15. 
 48 LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 52 (1968). 
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superstitious disrelish for change or some instinct for self-deceit, as to an 
impulse toward harmony and system.  By giving to the new law the 
verbal form of the old it facilitated its absorption into the existing corpus 
of rules.”49 
The enlarged concept of terra nullius,50 that lands inhabited by 
“backward peoples,” were vacant and occupied by no one was a fiction, 
although not one that can be said to serve any of the ends identified by 
Fuller and others.  In any other setting, the indigenous peoples’ 
occupation of their lands would have been seen as “statements” or 
“texts” that could be understood and their prior claims to the land then 
taken seriously.  Instead, Europeans declared indigenous lands that were 
in fact occupied, nonetheless open to their “discovery.”51  This fiction 
enabled the European “discoverers” to disregard the customary rights of 
the indigenous inhabitants in a way that appeared consistent with 
international law.52 
 
 49 Id. 
 50 The general concept refers to a thing or territory belonging to no one.  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1483 (7th ed. 1999). 
 51 Bryan, supra note 33, at 4-5.  Professor Bryan asserts that: 
[T]o answer the claim of terra nullius, on its own terms, is dangerous because it re-
describes Aboriginal relationships to land as ‘occupation,’ ‘possession,’ and ‘property.’  
We fall into the language and logic used by many legal practitioners and anthropologists 
who describe images of an Aboriginal past marred by its barbarism because we take on 
the categories of what will count as civilization—property being one of these. . . .  [T]o 
re-describe native reality is to actually change native reality: changed descriptions create 
new webs of meaning, and hence practices, identity, and worldviews will all be affected. 
Id. 
 52 Professor McNeil explains: 
At the dawn of the colonial era towards the end of the fifteenth century, there were no set 
rules for the acquisition of territories which were not already within the jurisdiction of 
the recognized sovereign.  The European powers sought to fortify shaky claims by 
whatever means they could, including assertions of discovery, symbolic acts of 
possession, papal bulls, the signing of treaties with rival States or local chiefs and 
princes, the establishment of settlements, and outright conquest by force of arms. . . .  
[The] practical [effect] . . . [was] that a sovereign who succeeded in exercising a 
sufficient degree of exclusive control was generally regarded as having acquired 
sovereignty. 
MCNEIL, supra note 39, at 110.  It thus became a rule that acquisition of sovereignty over terra 
nullius depend[ed] on effective occupation.”  Id.; see also MARK F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION 
AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO COLONIAL EXPANSION (Negro Univ. Press 1969) (1926); 
Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v. M’Intosh, 19 LAW & 
HISTORY REV. 67, 71 (2001).  In any case, the discovery rule did not dictate what rule determined 
the rights of the sovereign vis-a-vis the natives.  The French permitted their colonists to purchase 
directly from the Indians.  Id.  In the United States, some early settlers simply declared that the 
Indians had no rights to their own lands, largely on account of, in the eyes of the Europeans, the 
Indians’ non-European styled civilization.  Id. at 72. 
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What the law of England and international law otherwise required 
was recognition of title in the indigenous peoples.  The theory was that 
the moment sovereignty was acquired over a vacant territory, the Crown 
became “seised in demesne”53 of all lands, and remained so until it 
granted them out,54 but the pre-sovereignty rights of the indigenous 
people were not extinguished by the acquisition of sovereignty alone.  
Under the doctrine of continuity, there was a “presumption that in the 
absence of express confiscation or expropriatory legislation, those rights 
[held under local laws] would continue after a change in sovereignty.”55  
The rights allowed and preserved to the indigenous peoples depended, 
however, upon a classification of territories, which determined the law in 
force in the territory.56  In conquered and ceded territories [those 
acquired by war or treaty]  local laws and customs, in so far as they were 
not unconscionable or incompatible with the change in sovereignty, 
remained in force until altered or replaced by the Crown.”57  The “public 
property rights held by [the former ruler] would generally pass to the 
Crown along with sovereignty.”58 As for private property, the Crown 
would have an absolute power at the time of conquest or cession to 
seize, and thus acquire title to, both lands and chattel.”59  Where the 
Crown chose to do so, private persons who were deprived of their 
property in this way would have no remedy because the seizure would 
be an act of state, that is an act of sovereign power which is outside the 
jurisdiction of the courts.60  However, once the Crown accepted the 
territory into its dominions, the subjects of the former sovereign would 
be British subjects, and as a result, the Crown’s power to deal with them 
 
 53 The feudalistic concept of “seisin” meant the right of possession and also the burdens of 
delivering up feudal services to the overlord.  See S.F. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
COMMON LAW 118-19 (1969). 
 54 MCNEIL, supra note 39, at 135. 
 55 Id. at 161; Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 30-31 (1947).  In 
contrast, under the recognition doctrine, it is said that only such rights as the Crown deigned to 
recognize would be enforceable under the new regime.  Id.  McNeil  believes that only the doctrine 
of continuity is historically supportable.  MCNEIL, supra note 39, at 177.  For example, on October 
7, 1763, soon after the Treaty of Paris was signed and the English Crown acquired sovereignty of 
certain parts of Canada, “a Royal Proclamation was issued which, among other things, ‘for the 
present’ reserved certain lands to the nations or tribes of Indians who were connected with and 
living under the protection of the Crown, and prohibited colonial governors from granting warrants 
of survey or issuing patents for, and private persons from settling on or purchasing, those lands.”  
Id. at 270.  This meant that whatever rights the Indians had under the French had survived.  Id. 
 56 Id. at 113. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 117. 
 59 Id. at 162. 
 60 Id. at 162-63. 
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and their property by act of state would be at an end.61  The Crown 
“none the less retain[ed] prerogative legislative powers by virtue of 
which it could extinguish property rights,” but with compensation.62 
“In settled territories, English law accompanied the colonists to the 
extent it was applicable to the local circumstances.”63  Where such 
territories had indigenous populations, the importation of English law 
“did not necessarily abrogate pre-existing customary law,” but the extent 
to which English law was introduced and local law retained, varied with 
the circumstances.64 What is important is that the mere act of settling did 
not have the effect of vesting title in the sovereign.65  As a general 
matter, English law did not apply to regulate the internal affairs of 
indigenous people who had their own systems of law.66 At the same 
time, though, indigenous people would be protected by English law.67  
Thus, “if a settler—or even the Crown—attempted to justify seizure of 
lands occupied by [aboriginals] from pre-settlement times on the 
grounds that [indigenous] laws gave them no title,” English law would 
have given the aboriginals a remedy to fill the gap.68  If the territory did 
not have a customary system of real property law, English law would 
apply to give them a “common law aboriginal title.”69 
It was the case then that customary law was the source of 
indigenous rights in both conquered and ceded territories and settled 
territories.70  Customary law is generally a matter of fact, but it has 
proven difficult in the case of cultures with oral traditions and where the 
evaluation is Eurocentric.71 Possession under English law could ground 
title in the indigenous peoples.  But because possession is a conclusion 
of law, it could not exist apart from a legal system. Accordingly, 
indigenous peoples who were not known to have had a system of law 
could not be said to have been in possession.  They could, however, have 
 
 61 Id. at 163-64. 
 62 Id. at 164. 
 63 MCNEIL, supra note 39, at 114. 
 64 Id. at 115-16. 
 65 Id. at 179; Cohen, supra note 53, at 31-32. 
 66 MCNEIL, supra note 38, at 182.  “However, as British subjects and residents of one of the 
Crown’s dominions, in general [indigenous peoples] would have to respect English public law, 
especially law relating to serious crimes.”  Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 183. 
 69 Id. at 183, 207-08. 
 70 Id. at 161, 193. 
 71 Id. at 193, 195.  The indigenous peoples’ conception of land was not as a commodity that 
could be owned, but more as something of  “a sacred provider, to be used with respect bordering on 
reverence.”  Id. at 194. 
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been in occupation, because that is a matter of fact, which does not 
depend on the existence of law.72  Thus, if they were in occupation, 
English law would accord them possession in the absence of proof that 
possession was in another.73  The legal effect of this is that they would 
have been presumed to have been in possession, which would mean 
presumptive title and the right to defend against dispossession.74  This 
presumptive title at the moment a territory was acquired by settlement, 
would have given rise to common law aboriginal title.75  “Unless 
rebutted, it would be as effectual to defend or recover possession as a 
valid title by limitation, descent or purchase” and “would cover all lands 
occupied,” including the subsurface (except precious minerals, which by 
prerogative right belonged to the Crown) and “would entitle indigenous 
possessors to fee simple estates, for possession.”76  As the history 
reveals, however, it was the fiction and not the theory that held in North 
America and Australia. 
A.  Variations on Aboriginal Title in Three Nations: Canada, Australia 
and the United States 
When the English Crown asserted sovereignty over lands in what is 
now Canada, the aboriginal people became English subjects and entitled 
to rights, including the possession of their lands, but not fee simple 
title.77  In 1763, the Royal Proclamation by the English King George III 
“acknowledged the aboriginal people as “nations or tribes,” and . . . 
recognized that they continued to possess their traditional territories until 
they [were] “ceded to or purchased by the Crown.”78  The Canadian 
 
 72 Id. at 196-97. 
 73 Id. at 197.  The acts of occupation that should have been sufficient included the erection 
of permanent dwellings and other structures, cultivation of lands, identification of definite tracts 
over which domestic animals were herded and the occupation of land to which they resorted on a 
regular basis to hunt, fish, or collect the natural products of the earth.  Even outlying areas that were 
visited occasionally and regarded as being under their exclusive control and lands over which so-
called “hunters and gathers” passed should have been deemed in possession of the indigenous 
people.  Modern anthropological evidence is that few were indiscriminate wanderers, but tended to 
be attached to definite areas where they often had spiritual ties.  MCNEIL, supra note 39, at 201-03. 
 74 Id. at 207. 
 75 Id. at 207-08. 
 76 Id. at 208.  In the United States, the term used is “original Indian title” and in Australia, it 
is “native title.”  For convenience in this introduction to the concept, the single term, “aboriginal 
title” will be used.  The variations occurring among nations are discussed later. 
 77 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.).; Fred R. Fenwick, 
“Unresolved aboriginal land claims in British Columbia,” Law Now, January 1999, available at 
http://www.lexis.com. 
 78 Fenwick, supra note 77.  “Nearly one-third [of the text of the Royal Proclamation of 
1763] is devoted to British relations with Indigenous Nations, many of whom were allied with the 
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Supreme Court has since declared that the Proclamation pronounced 
assurances to aboriginals, but that is not the source of aboriginal title.  
Instead, aboriginal title is a legal right that pre-existed European contact 
and which did not need government recognition to exist.79 
The 1997 decision in Delgamuukw v. Province of British 
Columbia,80 is the seminal case on the nature and scope of aboriginal 
title in Canada.  As a foundational principle, the Court explained that 
“aboriginal title encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation 
of the land held pursuant to that title.”81  That exclusive right gives the 
 
British victors, referring to the Indigenous Peoples as “Nations,” as distinct societies with their own 
forms of political organization with whom treaties had to be negotiated.  It also enshrin[ed] 
protection of Indigenous lands by the British Crown, and a process for seeking Indigenous consent 
through a treaty process to allow for European settlement.”  Id. at 8-9.  It also spelled out that 
indigenous nations had an inalienable right to their lands.  Id.  It was a codification of the norms of 
customary international law for the Crown to enter into treaties with indigenous nations in the 
Americas.  SHARON H. VENNE, OUR ELDERS UNDERSTAND OUR RIGHTS: EVOLVING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 8 (1998). 
 79 Calder v. Attorney-Gen. of B. C., [1973] S.C.R. 313 (Can.). 
 80 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010.  There, appellants claimed 58,000 square kilometres in British 
Columbia, to which the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en (who together are some 5,500 to 7,000 members) 
claimed aboriginal title.  Id. at 1028-29.  But the claimed land was occupied also by some 30,000 
non-aboriginals.  Id. at 1029.  British Columbia “counterclaimed for a declaration that the appellants 
have no right or interest in and to the territory or alternatively, that the appellants’ cause of action 
ought to be for compensation from the Government of Canada.”  Id.  The trial court denied the 
complaint and the Supreme Court reversed and ordered a new trial.  Id. at 1028.  The Court stated 
that the factual findings made at trial could not stand because of the trial judge’s rejection of various 
kinds of oral histories which were offered in an attempt to establish occupation and use of the 
disputed territory, an essential requirement for aboriginal title.  Id. at 1079.  Had the oral histories 
been correctly assessed, the conclusions on these issues of fact might have been different.  Id. 
 81 Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1083.  To establish a claim to aboriginal title, the group 
asserting the claim must demonstrate that its ancestors had exclusive occupation of the lands at the 
time the Crown asserted sovereignty.  Id. at 1097-98, 1104.  Occupation can be established by the 
construction of dwellings, through the cultivation and enclosure of fields, by the regular use of 
definite tracts for hunting, fishing or by otherwise exploiting the land’s resources.  Id. at 1101.  In 
determining whether such occupation is sufficient to ground title, the group’s size, manner of life, 
material resources, technological abilities, and the character of the lands claimed must be taken into 
account as well as both the common law and the aboriginal perspective on land are considered.  Id. 
at 1101 (relying on R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (Can.)).  The Court ruled that “the ‘key’ 
factors  for recognizing aboriginal rights were met: 1) the nature of an aboriginal claim was 
identified precisely with regard to particular practices, customs and traditions; 2) the aboriginal 
society specified the area that had been continuously used and occupied by identifying general 
boundaries; 3) the aboriginal right of possession was based on the continued occupation and use of 
traditional tribal lands since the assertion of Crown sovereignty (although the date of sovereignty is 
not the only relevant time to consider as continuity could still exist where the present occupation of 
one area is connected to the pre-sovereignty occupation of another area and present occupation may 
be proof of prior occupation and it is not necessary to establish an unbroken chain of continuity); 4) 
the aboriginal peoples continued to occupy and use the land as part of their traditional way of life, 
the land being of central significance to them.  Delgamuukw [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1128-31.  Whether 
aboriginal rights are proprietary or usufructary in nature was not made entirely clear in 
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right to engage in specific activities that are aspects of aboriginal 
practices, customs and traditions integral to the claimant group’s 
distinctive aboriginal culture,82 as well as the right to use the land in 
ways that meet current needs and aspirations.83  Leaving no doubt, the 
Court declared that “the law of aboriginal title does not only seek to 
determine the historic rights of aboriginal peoples to land,” but also “to 
afford legal protection to prior occupation in the present day.”84  Implicit 
in this is a recognition of the importance of the continuity of the 
relationship of an aboriginal community to its land over time.  
Nonetheless, the Court said, those uses must not be irreconcilable with 
the nature of the attachment to the land which forms the basis of the 
group’s aboriginal title.85 
This grounding of aboriginal title in historic occupation by 
reference to traditional activities and uses marks it as sui generis and so 
distinguished from fee simple title.86  So standing apart, aboriginal title 
is inalienable, except to the Crown.  It can only be held communally.  If 
lands covered by aboriginal title are used in a way that sui generis title 
does not permit, they must be surrendered and the lands converted into 
non-title lands.87 
Aboriginal title, by the gross demarcations laid out in Delgamuukw 
that nonetheless provide a kind of template, have since been held to 
include the right of self-governance.  In Campbell v. British Columbia,88 
there was a constitutional challenge to certain provisions of the Nisga’a 
treaty that purported to give the Nisga’a the right of self-governance 
within their territory.89  The court identified three critical points in 
 
Delgamuukw.  Before that decision, these rights were long thought to be essentially usufructary in 
nature.  See, St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen, 14 App. Cas. 46 at 54 (1889).  
Some language in the decision, though, can be read to conclude that the rights are proprietary in 
nature, more like fee simple ownership.  Id. 
 82 Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1080-81. 
 83 Id. at 1083-85; Cf. Guerin v. Canada, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (Can.) (declaring the aboriginal 
interest in reserve and aboriginal title lands as the same and that the right to occupy is not qualified 
by reference to traditional and customary uses of those lands).  “[A]boriginal title encompass[es] 
mineral rights and lands held pursuant to aboriginal title should be capable of exploitation. . . .”  
Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1015. 
 84  Id. at 1088. 
 85  Id. at 1080, 1088. 
 86  Id. at 1080-81. 
 87  Id. at 1081-83. 
 88 [2000] 189 D.L.R. (4th) 333, 2000 C.R.D.J. LEXIS 310. 
 89 Id.  The challengers argued that inasmuch as the constitution had distributed all legislative 
power to Parliament, no legislative power could be recognized in any other body.  Id. at 10.  It was 
undisputed that long before the arrival of the Europeans, the Nisga’a occupied substantial areas in 
British Columbia and had identifiable cultural traditions, their own language, territories and legal 
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Delgamuukw that required the finding of a right of self-governance: 1) 
“aboriginal title originates in part from pre-existing systems of 
aboriginal law;” 2) Section 35 (1) of the Constitution provides protection 
to aboriginal rights “in its full form”; and 3) “aboriginal title 
encompasses within it a right to choose to what ends a piece of land can 
be put.” 90  The court drew from this that as aboriginal title in its full 
form gives the right to make decisions about the use of the land, there is 
a right to a political structure for making those decisions.91 
While these aboriginal rights are different from other common law 
rights, particularly in that they do not derive from or take their meaning 
solely from Western philosophies,92 the Supreme Court has emphasized 
that their essence is the bridging of aboriginal and non-aboriginal 
cultures, that they are a “form of intersocietal” law that evolved from 
long-standing practices linking the various communities.93  This sui 
generis characterization may mean that the extent to which indigenous 
peoples are entitled to be restored to land wrongfully taken should not be 
 
systems.  Id. at *38-39.  They were recognized as political communities, with the power to make 
laws in the constitutional sense.  Id. at *39-40, ¶ 106-107. 
 90 Id. at *62, ¶ 154. 
 91 Id. at *63-64, ¶ 157, *62, ¶ 154, citing Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 1088. In 
December 1995, the Canadian federal government published a policy statement entitled Aboriginal 
Self-Government: The Government of Canada’s Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right 
and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government.  It stated, inter alia: “The Government of 
Canada recognizes the inherent right of self-government as an existing aboriginal right under 
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.”  Campbell, [2000] 189 D.L.R. (4th) 333 at *79-80. 
 92 John Borrows & Leonard I. Rotman, The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does 
it Make a Difference?, 35 ALBERTA L. REV. 9, 10 (1997) (discussing generally the development of 
the use of the sui generis term to describe aboriginal rights in Canada. 
 93 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1108.  The Aboriginal 
conception of property would include things like “intuitive relationships with nature, or particular 
understandings of the community’s relationship to territory.  Such arrangements necessarily involve 
specific understandings of trapping lines, of fishing grounds that are expressed through kinship ties, 
and of the particular way that territory is familiar to each society.”  Bryan, supra note 33, at 26.  
Westerners “accustomed to see land and territory in terms of Cartesian space, and to see ownership 
based in transactional value” fail to grasp the full resonance of aboriginal relationship.  Id. at 27. 
Looking generally at the kinds of relations we might tend to call ‘proprietary’ in 
Aboriginal cultures, ‘property’ becomes embedded in seasonal significance, in kinship 
significance, in spiritual significance, or in terms of general cultural practice, not in 
‘chattels’ or ‘real property.’ . . . Thus, a tree is never simply timber; indeed a tree is often 
something else, and can even be one’s grandfather (the important thing is that it is one’s 
grandfather). . . . 
Id.  Bryan calls for new political and legal institutions that will allow divergent ways of life to 
cohere; and a model for understanding the area of differences between Canadian (common law and 
civilian) legal culture and the legal cultures of Aboriginal societies as they have developed.  Id. at 
29.  “In creating a new relationship we need to ensure that the Canadian side does not continue in its 
colonizing effects by using language and ideas instead of force as a form of unconscious eradication 
of alternative understandings of the world.”  Id.  at 27-28. 
16
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governed, at least not entirely, by European common law.94  It may also 
mean that conventional common law analogies have force only to the 
degree that they can be reconciled with the tradition, custom, practice or 
law of the aboriginal group claiming the right. Essentially, “sui generis 
territory allows for the expression and protection of Aboriginal rights 
that existed prior to, and independently of, the common law.”95 
In Australia, “native title” is recognized where it is not inconsistent 
with the common law.  The High Court of Australia so declared in Mabo 
v. Queensland (“Mabo II”).96 There, the Meriam people of the Murray 
Islands97 successfully sought a declaration that they had “native title” to 
the island.98  Upon their annexation by the English Crown, the Murray 
 
 94 See Kent McNeil, Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights: What’s The Connection?, 35 
ALBERTA L. REV. 117, 118, 120 (1997). 
 95 Borrows & Rotman, supra note 92, at 30-31.  These authors argue that the narrow focus 
of the Supreme Court on what constitutes a unique culture for purposes of finding aboriginal rights 
has removed the attention from formulations that consistently had their basis in the continued 
existence of prior legal systems within Canada and the contemporary legal conceptions these 
generate.  The result of this focus is that “the Court has departed from exploring how Aboriginal 
rights have come to existence within the common law and, instead, overly concentrated on who 
holds the right as grounding their existence.”  Id. at 36.  A misplaced focus on “aboriginality” as 
defining aboriginal rights may cause the court to focus upon “what was, once upon a time, integral 
to indigenous cultures,” and not on the dynamics of a living culture, with contemporary traditions, 
customs, practices and laws.  Id. at 36, 38. 
 96 [No. 2] (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1.  Mabo was presaged by Coe v. Commonwealth of Australia, 
(1979) 24 A.L.R. 118, in which an Aborigine made a broad complaint for an injunction against 
anyone using land currently being used by Aborigines.  The complaint was dismissed on procedural 
grounds.  Id.  Also before Mabo, was Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd, (1971) 17 F.L.R. 141, where 
the High Court of Australia ruled that Australia did not recognize communal native title and that the 
relationship of the aboriginal people to the territory they claimed did not create a right of property.  
The court did recognize that Aboriginal rights could exist, but that they could only be created by 
statute.  After the decision in Milirrpum, the Australian Parliament passed the Aboriginal Land 
Rights (Northern Territory) Act, (1976) c. 119 (Austl.) that gave an Aborigine statutory title to land 
once he proved that he had owned that land, so long as a claim was filed by June 5, 1997. 
 97 The Murray Islands lie in the Torres Strait, easternmost of the Eastern Islands of the 
Strait.  Mabo II, 175 C.L.R. at 16.  Id.  Their total land area is approximately 9 square kilometres.  
The Meriam people, Melanesian, were in occupation of the Islands for generations before the first 
Europeans arrived.  Id.  They lived a communal life in which gardening was of profound 
importance, significant not only for purposes of subsistence but for facilitating various rituals 
associated with different aspects of community life.  Id.  “Meriam society was regulated more by 
custom than by law.”  Id. at 18. 
 98 The Murray Islands were annexed to Queensland in 1879.  Id. at 1.  Upon annexation, the 
Meriam People were told that the Islands would be held amenable to British law.  Id. at 8.  By an act 
of the Queensland Government in 1882, the Murray Islands were “reserved” for native inhabitants.  
Mabo II, 175 C.L.R. at 2.  In the same year, a special lease of two acres on one of the islands was 
granted by the Queensland Government to the London Missionary Society, which had assumed 
some responsibility for law and order and for the peaceful resolution of disputes.  Id.  The chief 
question for the court was whether these transactions had the effect of vesting in the Crown absolute 
ownership of, legal possession of, and exclusive power to confer title to, all land in the Murray 
Islands.  Id. at 25.  The Court answered in the negative.  Id. at 2. 
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Islands were deemed “desert and uninhabited,” thereby becoming 
subject to the laws in force in Queensland, the common law becoming 
the basic law.99  A century later, the High Court of Australia would 
reject this characterization.  Rather than terra nullius, the evidence 
reconsidered showed that the Meriam had “a subtle and elaborate 
[political] system” adapted to the country, providing a stable order of 
society.  It was a government of laws, and not of men.100  It was 
admitted that the application of the enlarged notion of terra nullius 
“depended on a discriminatory denigration of indigenous inhabitants, 
their social organization and customs,” and was justified by a policy 
which has “no place in the contemporary law of this country.”101  
Though the rejection of terra nullius cleared away the fictional 
impediment to the recognition of indigenous rights and interests in 
colonial land, it would still be impossible to recognize native title if the 
basic doctrines of the common law were inconsistent with their 
recognition.102  They were not.103 
The characteristics of native title mirror those of aboriginal title in 
Canada in the sense of title being founded in and given its content by the 
traditional laws and customs acknowledged and observed by the 
indigenous occupants.104  It is also so in the sense of being 
extinguishable if the indigenous group ceases to acknowledge those 
traditional laws and customs on which native title is founded, loses its 
 
 99 Id. at 58. 
 100 Id. at 38. 
 101 Id. at 41-43.  Referring to Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol. 
 102 Id. at 68; see also Wik Peoples v. Queensland, (1996) 187 C.L.R. 1, available at [1996] 
WL 33102484. 
 103 Mabo II, 175 C.L.R. at 71.  First, the Court concluded that  “[r]ecognition of the radical 
title of the Crown [was] quite consistent with recognition of native title to land, for the radical title, 
without more, is merely a logical postulate required to support the doctrine of tenure (when the 
Crown has exercised its sovereign power to grant an interest in land) and to support the plenary title 
of the Crown (when the Crown has exercised its sovereign power to appropriate to itself ownership 
of parcels of land within the Crown’s territory).”  Id. at 50.  Unless the sovereign power is exercised 
in one or other of those ways, there is no reason why land within the Crown’s territory should not 
continue to be subject to native title.”  Id. at 50-51.  The Court went on to reject the “patrimony of 
the nation” basis of the proposition of absolute Crown ownership, to the extent that the political 
power to dispose of land in disregard of native title has not occurred, native title can still be 
recognized.  Id. at 52.  The Court also rejected the Royal Prerogative basis of the proposition of 
absolute Crown sovereignty, relying on the rule that in the absence of express confiscation or of 
subsequent exproprietary legislation, the conqueror has respected indigenous claims to land and 
forbone to diminish or modify them and further, that a mere change in sovereignty does not 
extinguish native title to land.  Id. at 53. 
 104 Id. at 71; see generally, Matthew C. Miller, Comments, An Australian Nunavut? A 
Comparison of Inuit and Aboriginal Rights Movements in Canada and Australia, 12 EMORY INT’L 
L. REV. 1175, 1195 (1998). 
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connection with the land or ceases to exist as a group or clan.105  Like 
Canadian aboriginal title, native title is inalienable except to the 
Crown.106  Where a difference in theory, may lie if only subtly, is where 
Australia has assigned native title in the Australian property law system.  
Native title is neither an institution of the common law, nor a form of 
common law land tenure, but it is recognized by the common law.107  
Rights and interests possessed under the traditional laws or customs of 
the aboriginal peoples are therefore not enforceable per se, but only to 
the extent that the common law or some statute recognizes and gives 
effect to them.108  Looked upon as rights that are in a sense alien or 
extraneous to the common law system, they are inferior and 
precarious.109 
“Original Indian title”110 is a federal common law right that gives a 
“right of occupancy” to recognized Indian Tribes.111  The Supreme Court 
has spoken of original Indian title as an “unquestioned right” to the 
exclusive possession of aboriginal lands112 and as a right of occupancy 
“as sacred as the fee simple of the whites.”113  That characterization was 
not altogether true.114 
 
 105 Mabo II, 175 C.L.R. at 71. 
 106 It follows, therefore, that one who is not a member of the indigenous people holding 
native title, who does not acknowledge their laws and observe their customs, can acquire no interest 
in the land by transfer. The Meriam people from the advent of the English “asserted an exclusive 
right to occupy the Murray Islands and, as a community, held a proprietary interest in the Islands.  
They have maintained their identity as a people and they observ[ed] customs which [were] 
traditionally based.”  Id. at 61. 
 107 Id. at 59-61. 
 108 Id. at 59, 61; Wik Peoples v. Queensland, (1996) 187 C.L.R. 1, *3, available at [1996] 
WL 33102484.  [Wik Peoples v. Queensland]. 
 109 See Nehal Bhuta, Mabo, Wik and the Art of Paradigm Management, 22 MELBOURNE U. 
L. R. 24, 36, 40 (1998) (discussing the place of native title in the Australian property law hierarchy); 
Michael Mansell, Australians and Aborigines and the Mabo Decision: Just Who Needs Whom the 
Most?, 15 SYDNEY L. REV. 168 (1993). 
 110 See generally, Cohen, supra note 55.  Howard R. Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal 
Rights in the Early Legal History of the United States, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 637 (1977). 
 111 Cohen, supra note 55, at 28. 
 112 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (Mem.). 
 113 Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835); United States v. Santa Fe Pac. 
R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938). 
 114 In fact, during the early expansionist movement in this country, the government pursued a 
policy of “removal and relocation of many tribes, often by treaty but also by force.”  Cobell v. 
Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see generally, Ralph W. Johnson, Indian Tribes and 
the Legal System, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1021, 1022 (1997).  “In the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the policy of relocation was replaced with one of assimilation, . . . [when] the federal 
government began to divide Indian lands into individual parcels, taking lands that had been set aside 
for Indian tribes and allotting them to individual tribal members.”  Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1087; see 
generally, FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 210 (Univ. of New Mexico Press 
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The Supreme Court decision in Johnson v. M’Intosh115 is often the 
starting point for understanding the nature of original Indian title.  But 
the opinion is fraught with incoherence and ad hoc rationalizations.  
Chief Justice Marshall vacillated on the theory that the European nations 
acquired title to land first occupied by Indian Tribes, first referring to the 
doctrine of discovery,116 then stating that discovery could be converted 
into conquest, by which means Indian lands could be taken against their 
will.117 
 
1971) (1942).  The objectives were “to extinguish tribal sovereignty, erase reservation boundaries, 
and force assimilation of Indians into the society at large.’”  Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1087, citing 
Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 254 (1992); Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 
851 F.2d 1439, 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  “Once tribal lands were allotted in fee to individual Indians, 
white settlers could purchase the lands for settlement. . . .  [The assimilationist policy] may not have 
achieved assimilation, [but] it did result in the widespread transfer of land from Indians to white 
settlers. . . .  [Between] 1887 to 1934, an estimated 90 million acres, accounting for approximately 
two-thirds of all Indian lands, left Indian ownership.”  Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1087.  Citing Cobell v. 
Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1999) (“Cobell V”).  “Allotment of tribal lands [ended] with 
enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (“IRA”), 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 
25 U.S.C. § 461 et. seq).”  Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1087.  “After passage of the IRA, federal Indian 
policy changed yet again.  In the 1950’s,  Congress adopted a ‘termination policy,’ whereby it 
sought to release Indian tribes from federal supervision and terminate the government-Indian 
relationship.”  Id.  “The termination policy . . . was replaced with the current policy of ‘self-
determination and self-governance.”. . .  Id. at 1088. 
 115 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).  There, plaintiffs claimed title through Indian tribes on the 
basis of deeds made out some fifty years earlier.  Id. at 571-72.  The defendants claimed the same 
land under later-executed patents from the United States.  Id. at 578.  The plaintiffs sought the 
remedy of ejectment.  Id. at 571.  The facts showed the “authority of the Indian chiefs who executed 
[the] conveyance” and also that the “particular tribes for whom these chiefs acted were in rightful 
possession of the land they sold.”  Id. at 572.  Thus, if the received first principle of first possession 
had been applied, plaintiffs’ title should have been found to be good and defendant’s void.  Id. at 
596-97. 
 116 Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572; see also ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN 
INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 312 (1990).  In Worcester 
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the principle agreed to by 
the colonial powers “regulated the right given by discovery among the european discoverers; but 
could not affect the rights of those already in possession, either as aboriginal occupants, or as 
occupants by virtue of a discovery made before the memory of man.  It gave the exclusive right to 
purchase, but did not found that right on a denial of the right of the possessors to sell.”  Id. at 544. 
 117 Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 589.  Compare the views of Justice Johnson in his dissent 
in  Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 146 (1810).  In his dissent, Justice Johnson pointed out 
that Indian nations whose lands had not been acquired by conquest or purchase were ‘absolute 
proprietors of their soil.’  Id. at 147.  Since more than one fee simple could not exist in the same 
land at the same time, the absolute proprietorship of the Indians excluded the seisin in fee of 
another.  Id. at 146-47.  On what interest the United States had in the soil, Justice Johnson explained 
that “[u]naffected by particular treaties, it is nothing more than what was assumed at the first 
settlement of the country, to wit, a right of conquest or of purchase, exclusively of all competitors 
within certain defined limits.  All the restrictions upon the right of soil in the Indians, amount only 
to an exclusion of all competitors from their markets.” Id. at 147.  McNeil points out, though, that 
neither Johnson, nor Marshall got it right.  In English law, “the solution to the problem . . . would 
20
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The theory of conquest seemed belied by the continual warring 
between settlers and the Indians.118  With respect to discovery, the Court 
applied neither English common law nor international law, under which 
the Indians would have been regarded as English subjects and given 
protections against the taking of lands occupied by them.119  Professor 
McNeil’s assessment is that 
[W]hen questions involving indigenous land rights began to come 
before the courts, the tendency was to look for answers outside English 
law.  Chief Justice Marshall’s early American decisions in particular 
ignored common law principles and constructed a vague theory of 
Indian title on the basis of doubtful premises drawn to some extent 
from his own perceptions of international law.  In effect, what 
Marshall did was invent a body of law which was virtually without 
precedent.120 
Professor Cohen added: 
It is perhaps Pickwickian to say that the Federal Government exercised 
power to make grants of lands still in Indian possession as a 
consequence of its ‘dominion’ or ‘title.’  A realist would say that 
Federal ‘dominion’ or ‘title’ over land recognized to be in Indian 
ownership was merely a fiction devised to get around a theoretical 
difficulty posed by common law concepts. . . . [that], a grant by a 
private person of land belonging to another would convey no title.  To 
apply this rule to the Federal Government would have produced a cruel 
dilemma: either Indians had no title and no rights or the Federal land 
grants on which much of our economy rested were void.  The Supreme 
Court would accept neither horn of this dilemma, nor would it say . . . 
 
have been to accord the State seisin in fee of a paramount lordship over lands of which the Indian 
occupiers would have been seised in demesne for fee simple estates.”  MCNEIL, supra note 39, at 
252. 
 118 In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955), the Court settled on the 
theory of conquest.  The Court declared that the American colonies were acquired by conquest such 
that absolute title to the soil vested in the conquering European power automatically, along with 
sovereignty.  Id. at 280.  This meant that while the new sovereign allowed the Indian inhabitants to 
remain in occupation, the Indians had a right of occupancy as against third parties, but no rights at 
all as against the sovereign, unless he recognized their occupation as ownership.  Id.  Absent such 
recognition, their original Indian title would be non-proprietary, amounting merely to permissive 
occupation at the will of the sovereign.  Id.  Indeed, according to Congress, the United States 
claimed title by right of conquest only once and then only half-heartedly.  Kades, supra note 52, at 
74.  In fact, the United States purchased much of the land it obtained from Indian Tribes.  Id. 
 119 MCNEIL, supra note 39, at 246.  Indeed, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 did this.  Id. at 
248.  Where persons of European descent were concerned, American courts adopted an approach 
based on the doctrine of continuity.  Id.; United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 86-87 
(1833). 
 120 MCNEIL, supra note 39, at 301. 
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that the Federal Government is not bound by the limitation of common 
law doctrine . . . [this] . . . would have run contrary to the spirit of the 
times by claiming for the Federal Government a right to disregard rules 
of real property law more sacred than the Constitution itself.  And this 
theoretical dilemma was neatly solved by Chief Justice Marshall’s 
doctrine that the Federal Government and the Indians both had 
exclusive title to the same land at the same time.121 
Chief Justice Marshall was not otherwise inclined to examine the 
legality of acts upon which the land titles of so many Americans 
depended.  The result of this constraint was to make the issue of the 
Indians’ land rights a political one and nonjusticiable.122  The 
consequence of “drawing this judicial blind on the past, was to sanction 
future seizures of Indian lands as well as to assign the whole matter to 
the political arena.  Where their original title was concerned . . ., Indians 
[were] therefore denied constitutional protection accorded to [other] 
American citizens.”123 
Decisions about the nature and contours of original Indian title were 
virtually ad hoc until 1955 when the Supreme Court finally concluded 
that such title conferred no proprietary interest in the Indians, merely 
 
 121 Cohen, supra note 56, at 48-49. 
 122 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574, 588-92. 
 123 MCNEIL, supra note 39, at 261.  The defendant in M’Intosh would have denied all rights 
to the Indians, arguing that they could not have passed title to the plaintiffs’ predecessors because 
“by the law of nature,” the Indians themselves had never done acts on the land sufficient to establish 
property in it, i.e., the Indians had never really undertaken those acts of possession that gave rise to 
a property right in the first place.  Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 569.  It was the case that the 
Indian tribes moved from place to place, leaving few traces to indicate that they claimed the land (if 
indeed they did). The argument was essentially that Indian cultures before the coming of the 
Europeans was in the “state of nature,” that is, pre-society and pre-government, that the land 
occupied by Indian nations was terra nullius and as such could be appropriated by those who would 
dominate.  Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of the 
American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. R. 1, 3 (1983).  This argument did have 
appeal at the time of the decision to the extent that the theory of first possession made sense in an 
agrarian society or among commercial people—a people whose activities with respect to the objects 
around them required an unequivocal assertion of dominion such that those objects could  be either 
managed or traded.  On the other hand, “some Indians professed bewilderment at the concept of 
owning the land.  Indeed they prided themselves on not marking the land but rather on moving 
lightly through it, living with the land and with its creatures as members of the same family rather 
than as strangers who visited only to conquer the objects of nature.”  Rose, supra note 27, at 87-88.  
See generally, Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of 
European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 237 (1989); see generally, WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, 
AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND (1983).  While that was not the nature of the American 
Indian society, evaluating the Indians’ connection with the land on the basis of their own conditions 
of life and their own perspectives, would no doubt be regarded as occupation sufficient for 
grounding title.  MCNEIL, supra note 39, at 117. 
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permission to occupy government-owned lands.124  As it stands then, it is 
a perpetual right that entitles the holders to full beneficial use of 
aboriginal lands including the right to standing timber and subsurface 
minerals,125 but it is not alienable either voluntarily or involuntarily, 
except to, or with the approval of, the federal government.126 
B.  Sovereign Prerogative of Extinguishment 
By constitutional amendment: “[t]he  existing aboriginal and treaty 
rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are . . . recognized and 
affirmed.”127  They nevertheless can be infringed, under certain 
circumstances,128 where there is a valid governmental objective sought 
to be accomplished by the challenged infringement,129 those objectives 
are “compelling and substantial,”130 there is not an underlying 
unconstitutional objective, the infringement is “absolutely necessary to 
accomplish the required limitation,” and the infringement is consistent 
with the Crown’s fiduciary duty to the Aboriginal peoples.131  Because 
 
 124 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 285. 
 125 Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 
553 (1902); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938). 
 126 Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574. 
 127 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), § 35(1).  After the assertion of sovereignty by the 
British Crown, and continuing to and after the time of Confederation, although the right of 
aboriginal people to govern themselves was diminished, it was not extinguished.  Any aboriginal 
right to self-government could be extinguished after Confederation and before the 1982 
constitutional amendment by federal legislation which plainly expressed that intention, or it could 
be replaced or modified by the negotiation of treaty.  After 1982, such rights could not be 
extinguished, but could be defined (given content) in a treaty. [The Nisga’a Treaty does the latter]  
See Campbell v. British Columbia, [2000] 189 D.L.R. (4th) 333, 2000 C.R.D.J. LEXIS 281 at *2-3. 
 128 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. The case involved the traditional rights of 
Aboriginal peoples to fish and whether those rights fell under the regulatory scheme established by 
federal fishing legislation.  Id.  The court laid down what has since come to be known as the 
“Sparrow justificatory test” for determining when aboriginal rights can be curtailed.  It must be 
established that: 1) an applicant for relief was acting pursuant to aboriginal authority; 2) the right 
was extinguished prior to the enactment of § 35(1); 3) the right had been infringed; and 4) the 
infringement was justified.  Id. 
 129 These include objectives concerned with conservation and management, “agriculture, 
forestry, mining and hydro-electric power, the general economic development of the interior of 
British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered species, and the building of 
infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to support those aims.”  Delgamuukw v. 
British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1021.  However, a general aim to further the “public 
interest” is not an adequate justification.  Id. 
 130 In this vein, the right to exclusive use and occupation of land is relevant to the degree of 
scrutiny the infringing measure or action should be given. 
 131 The fulfillment of this fiduciary duty requires that in appropriate circumstances, the 
Crown is obliged to choose those methods involving the least amount of infringement on Aboriginal 
rights to effect the desired result and to consult with the Aboriginal peoples.  The right of the Crown 
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lands held pursuant to aboriginal title have an inescapable economic 
component, fair compensation will ordinarily be required when 
aboriginal title is infringed.132 
In Mabo II, the High Court of Australia lamented the misfortune of 
the Aboriginal peoples of Australia that over the last 200 years, “the 
government . . . [having] alienated or appropriated to its own purposes 
most of the [traditional aboriginal lands] . . . in th[e] country.”133  That 
was a consequence of sovereignty which carried the power to create and 
to extinguish private rights and interests in land within the sovereign’s 
territory.134  That sovereign power may or may not be exercised with 
solicitude for the welfare of indigenous inhabitants, and in the case of 
the Aboriginal people, it seems it was not.  The Aboriginals “were 
dispossessed by the Crown’s exercise of its sovereign powers to grant 
land to whom it chose and to appropriate to itself the beneficial 
ownership of parcels of land for the Crown’s purposes.”135  
Nevertheless, native title was not extinguished by the mere operation of 
the common law on first settlement by British colonists. Extinguishment 
instead required the exercise of a power to extinguish and needed to be 
accomplished by a clear and plain intention to do so.136  Consequently, 
where the Crown had not granted interests in land or reserved and 
dedicated land inconsistently with the right to continued enjoyment of 
native title by the indigenous inhabitants, native title survived and is 
legally enforceable.137  This means that grants of estates of freehold or of 
leases; the appropriation for use by the government (whether by 
dedication, setting aside, reservation or other valid means); and the use 
of native lands for roads, railways, post offices and other permanent 
public works which preclude the continuing concurrent enjoyment of 
 
to choose the uses to which the land can be put, subject to the ultimate limitation that those uses 
cannot destroy the ability of the land to sustain future generations of Aboriginal peoples requires the 
involvement of Aboriginal peoples in such decisions. 
 132 Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 1075. 
 133 Mabo II, at 175 C.L.R. 1, *68. 
 134 Id.  The exercise of sovereignty was nonetheless subject to the Constitution and other 
valid laws, such as the Racial Discrimination Act.  For example, the Queensland Coast Island 
Declaratory Act of 1985 purported to extinguish retrospectively any and all traditional rights to land 
in the Torres Strait without compensation.  That Act was declared invalid by the High Court, as 
being contrary to the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975.  Mabo v. Queensland (“Mabo I”), (1988) 
166 C.L.R. 186. 
 135 Mabo II, 175 C.L.R. at *68. 
 136 Id. citing Calder v. Attorney-Gen. [1973] S.C.R. 313, 404; Baker Lake v. Minister of 
Indian Affairs [1979] 107 D.L.R. (3d) 513, 552; Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; United States v. 
Santa Fe Pac. R..R.. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 353-54 (1941); Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 
Ct. Cl. 487 (1967). 
 137 Mabo II, 175 C.L.R. at *68-69. 
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native title, extinguished native title, but grants of lesser interests (such 
as the authority to prospect for minerals), did not.138  As it stands, 
aboriginal lands that have been conveyed to private holders are forever 
lost. 
Original Indian title can be terminated and fully disposed of by the 
federal government with no obligation to compensate its holders.139  The 
Supreme Court declared: “Indian occupation of land without government 
recognition of ownership creates no rights against taking or extinction by 
the United States protected by the Fifth Amendment or any other 
principle of law.”140  The sovereign’s intent to extinguish original Indian 
title, though, must be “plain and unambiguous” and will not “lightly be 
implied.”141  It is not extinguished by a grant by the government of the 
fee, but that grantee takes title subject to the Indian right of 
occupancy.142  The “right of occupancy” that original Indian title gives 
should be distinguished from “recognized title,” the latter existing where 
Congress, by treaty or other agreement, has declared that thereafter 
Indians are to hold lands permanently.  Recognized title cannot be 
abrogated by the government without due process of law and 
compensation.  In contrast, where Congress has made provision to 
Indian Tribes to recover for injury by the disposal of original Indian title, 
it was simply as a matter of grace.143 
 
 138 In Mabo II, the High Court explained that “[a] clear and plain intention to extinguish 
native title is not revealed by a law which merely regulates the enjoyment of native title [fn omitted] 
or which creates a regime of control that is consistent with the continued enjoyment of native title. 
[fn omitted] A fortiori, a law which reserves or authorizes the reservation of land from sale for the 
purpose of permitting indigenous inhabitants and their descendants to enjoy their native title works 
no extinguishment.”  Id. at *64-65. 
 139 Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937). 
 140 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 285 (1955).  There, by a resolution of 
Congress, “the Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to contract for the sale of national forest 
timber within [the] National Forest ‘notwithstanding any claim of possessory rights,’” which were 
defined as “all rights . . . which are based upon aboriginal occupancy or title.”  Id. at 276. 
 141 Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 227 (1985). 
 142 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); see generally, Cohen, supra note 
121, at 29-30. 
 143 Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 281.  Although not constitutionally compelled to do so, 
Congress eventually passed a statute compensating native inhabitants of Alaska for the loss of their 
land in the amount of $962.5 million plus about 40 million acres of federal lands.  Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act of 1971, 43 U.S.C. § 1601, et. seq.  The act extinguished land claims to 335 
million acres. 
25
Green: Specific Relief for Ancient Deprivations of Property
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003
GREEN1.DOC 3/19/03  3:15 PM 
270 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:245 
IV.  RECLAIMING ABORIGINAL LANDS 
A.  Legal Theories 
Can the Wiljen People establish aboriginal title to Antarctica?  Can 
the Miami Tribe do the same in the State of Illinois?  Can the Gitksan 
and Wet’suwet’en establish title to British Vancouver?  In Canada, by 
constitutional provision, aboriginal title is recognized, although it is left 
to the aboriginal claimants to establish title in accordance with the 
principles laid down by the Canadian Supreme Court.  Indigenous 
peoples therefore are offering proof of prior possession and adherence to 
traditional customs and laws as the predicate for a judicial declaration of 
aboriginal title.  In Australia, indigenous people have been prosecuting 
claims under the Native Title Act144 for declarations of native title based 
on traditional connections to the land.145  Although under the principles 
laid out in Mabo II, the only land available for such claims is that held 
by the Crown and by mineral interest lessees of the Crown, but not lands 
covered by grants from the Crown, those grants having extinguished 
native title.146 
 
 144 Native Title Act of 1993, c. 110 (Austl.). 
 145 See, e.g., Ngalakan People v. Northern Territory, Fed. Ct. of Austl., 2001 Aust. Fed. Ct. 
LEXIS 49, *6, *58 (June 5, 2001) (establishing title over a small area on the southern bank of the 
Roper River in the Northern Territory by evidence that at the time the Crown acquired sovereignty, 
the claimants were an identifiable community or organized society who possessed, occupied, used 
and enjoyed the claim area according to their traditional laws and customs); See also Passi v. 
Queensland, 2001 WL 665585 (June 14, 2001) (stating that claim to land and inland waters of the 
islands of Dauar and Waier settled upon proof of claimants long connection with the land, and their 
traditional laws and customs.; The native title established including the right to live on the land, 
conserve, manage, use and enjoy the natural resources of it, including for social, cultural, economic, 
religious, spiritual, customary and traditional purposes and autonomy over the land); Ngallametta v. 
Queensland, 2000 Aust. Fed.Ct LEXIS 809 (3 Oct. 2000) (noting that the agreement for the 
settlement of a claim to unallocated Crown lands, which title conferred possession, occupation, use 
and enjoyment, but not minerals); Anderson v. Western Australia, 2000 Aust. Fed.Ct. LEXIS 1071 
*8 (Nov. 28, 2000) (discussing an agreement between the state of Western Australia and the 
Spinifex people for the return of 55,000 square kilometres, which covered the southern portion of 
the Great Victoria Desert).  Id.; The terms of the settlement recognized native title, including the 
right to possess, occupy, use and enjoy the land, the right to make decisions about the land, but not 
to minerals or petroleum or subterranean waters, except in the case of water taken in the exercise of 
certain specified native title rights.  Id.  The Spinifex established their claim by demonstrating their 
long connection with the land and their distinct customs and practices). 
 146 The Native Title Act validated all prior acts where native title was under the sole 
ownership of non-natives and had thereby been effectively extinguished.  However, aborigines 
whose native title was extinguished were entitled to compensation if their title was extinguished 
after the enactment of Commonwealth’s Racial Discrimination Act of 1975, as long as they could 
demonstrate their connection with the land at the time of annexation. As a result of Mabo II and the 
Act, over three hundred native title claims were filed with the Tribunal by 1997.  The Act also 
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss2/2
GREEN1.DOC 3/19/03  3:15 PM 
2003] SPECIFIC RELIEF FOR ANCIENT DEPRIVATIONS OF PROPERTY 271 
In the United States where original Indian title has not been 
extinguished by the federal government, it theoretically can be recovered 
from current non-native occupiers, since by its definition it was 
incapable of alienation in the first place.  For more than two centuries, 
the Indian Nonintercourse Acts147 have made any purported conveyance 
of aboriginal lands void.  The first such Act was passed in 1790 and has 
not changed materially since that time.148  The original purposes stated 
were to prevent the “unfair, improvident or improper disposition” of 
tribal lands to parties other than the United States, without the consent of 
Congress, and to prevent Indian unrest over encroachment by settlers on 
Indian lands.149  The original Act dealt with unauthorized alienation of 
Indian lands in two ways: it declared that any such conveyance made in 
violation of the Act’s provisions shall be of no validity in law or equity 
and also prescribed penalties—fines, imprisonment and forfeiture.150 
 
established the National Native Title Tribunal, a mediating body, to process and hear native title 
claims and fund programs to assist disputes over native title. 
 147 25 U.S.C. § 177. 
 148 Id.  The Act provides: “No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any 
title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or 
equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution.”  
Id. 
 149 See Nonintercourse Act, 1 Stat. 329-32 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177). 
 150 The first Act established the framework for addressing contracts between the Indians and 
non-Indians, which the later Acts followed and expanded upon.  Id. at 329.  Section 3 required 
persons caught attempting to trade with the Indians or found in Indian country without a license to 
forfeit all the merchandise in their possession, and provided that such person could be fined or 
imprisoned.  Id. at 329.  Section 5 of the 1793 Act provided that “if any such citizen or inhabitant 
shall make a settlement on lands belonging to any Indian tribe . . . he shall forfeit a sum not 
exceeding one thousand dollars, nor less than one hundred dollars, and suffer imprisonment not 
exceeding twelve months” and gave the President the power to remove unlawful settlers.  Id. at 329, 
330.  (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 180).  The 1796 Act also included the forfeiture provisions, that any 
person settling on Indian land shall “forfeit all his right, title and claim, if any he has, of whatsoever 
nature or kind the same shall, or may be, to the lands aforesaid.”  Id.  Congress repealed the 
forfeiture provisions in 1802.  The 1796, 1799 and 1802 Acts also contained a comprehensive 
remedial scheme for handling private disputes between Indians and non-Indians.  Section 4 in all 
three versions required non-Indians to compensate Indians for property taken or destroyed by them 
[concerned with personal property] in an amount equal to twice the value of such property and if the 
offender was unable to pay a sum at least equal to the value of the property, the shortfall would be 
paid out of the Treasury, subject to the Indians’ obligation not to seek private revenge or satisfaction 
by force or violence.  The 1834 version purported to strengthen the powers of the president the 
government to remove all persons found to be illegally in Indian Country, authorizing him to take 
whatever measures were necessary to remove persons making settlements on Indian lands.  
Nonintercourse Act, 4 Stat. 730.  At the same time, Congress repealed the criminal penalties, but 
retained the provisions for fines.  Id.  Congress also added: “All penalties which shall accrue under 
this act, shall be sued for and recovered in an action of debt, in the name of the United States, . . . 
the one half going to the use of the informer, and the other half to the use of the United States, 
except when the prosecution shall be first instituted on behalf of the United States, in which case the 
whole shall be to their use.”  Id. 
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The other available legal theory for the recovery of aboriginal lands 
is breach of treaty as to “recognized title,” where that breach amounts to 
a taking of property.  But that theory was not always available.  Until 
1871, the federal policy was to deal with Indian tribes by means of 
treaties.  After that time, Congress determined to relate to Indians only 
by acts of Congress.151  But even treaty rights acquired before 1871 were 
precarious and subject to the politics in Congress.  In Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock,152 the Supreme Court ruled that the same plenary power that 
allowed Congress to extinguish aboriginal title, also authorized it to 
abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty under which recognized title 
arose.153 That power, said the Court “ha[d] always been . . . a political 
one, not subject to be controlled by the judicia[ry].”154  Thus, where 
Congress purported to give the Indians adequate consideration for their 
lands affected by the abrogation of a treaty, the court would presume 
that Congress acted in perfect good faith in dealing with the Indians and 
exercised its best judgment in the matter.155  The result of Lone Wolf was 
that if the Indians suffered injury by Congress’ unilateral abrogation of 
treaty rights, the courts would offer no aid.  Instead, relief would have to 
be sought by an appeal to Congress.  In this sense, Lone Wolf seemed to 
render “recognized title” indistinguishable from “original Indian title.”  
Although the case has never been expressly overruled, it has been 
 
 151 The Act provided: 
No Indian nation or tribe, within the territories of the United States shall be 
acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power, with whom the 
United States may contract by treaty; but no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and 
ratified with any such Indian Nation or tribe prior to March third, eighteen hundred and 
twenty-one, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired. 
Act of March 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 566, carried into § 2079. 
 152 187 U.S. 553, 565-66 (1903).  There, an 1867 treaty with certain Indian tribes established 
a reservation and provided that no treaty for the cession of reservation lands would be “of any 
validity or force” unless executed and signed by three-quarters of the adult males.  Id. at 564.  In 
1892, the Indians agreed to cede that reservation to the United States, in return for allotments out of 
those lands and the payment to and setting aside for the Indians of $2 million.  Id. at 555.  The 
requisite three-quarters of the Indians did not sign the agreement.  Id. at 556.  But in 1900, Congress 
enacted a statute which in effect adopted the 1892 agreement.  Id. at 559.  The Indians filed suit 
seeking to enjoin the government from carrying out the statute because it violated the 1867 treaty 
requirement of consent by three-fourths of adult male Indians.  Id. at 560. 
 153 Id. at 565-66.  The Court cautioned though that “presumably such power will be exercised 
only when circumstances arise which will not only justify the government in disregarding the 
stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the interest of the country and Indians themselves, that 
it should do so.”  Id. at 566. 
 154 Id. at 565. 
 155 Id. at 567-68.  The Court explained that because Congress has the power to abrogate 
treaties, the Court may not specially consider contentions that the signatures of the Indians signing 
the agreement to cede land were obtained by fraud or that the requisite three-quarter signatures were 
not obtained.  Id. at 567-68. 
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limited to its facts, such that where a court finds government conduct not 
evincing that degree of good faith required of a guardian to its ward, or 
the consideration offered in exchange for the abrogation of the treaty is 
inadequate, the Indians may be entitled to compensation.156 
B.  Legal Forums 
Indians were thwarted and relegated to pleas to Congress157 
regarding their aboriginal lands not solely because of the Supreme 
Court’s judicial blind on the fact of original Indian title or the sui generis 
conception of aboriginal title, but in large part because the usual 
mechanisms for the protection of property were denied to Indians.158  
The United States could not be sued without its consent and while the 
Court of Claims permitted litigation of certain types of suits against the 
government, 159 claims based upon violation of Indian treaties were 
excluded from its jurisdiction in 1863.160  Special congressional acts 
were commonly required before tribes could bring suit and on various 
occasions, Congress did pass such legislation.161  In other respects, while 
they were not aliens, Indians were not at the same time uniformly 
granted citizenship.162 As Indian Tribes could not maintain actions in the 
 
 156 See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980), discussed supra, note 11 finding 
the United States liable for failing to fulfill its obligations under treaty.  Also, the Court stated that 
“[m]ore significantly, Lone Wolf’s presumption of congressional good faith has little to commend it 
as an enduring principle for deciding questions of the kind presented here. . . .”  Id. at 414-15.  See 
also United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935) (stating that although an abrogation of 
treaty is effective, the Indian Tribe will be entitled to compensation for a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment); Sioux Nation v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157, 1175-76 (Claims 1979) (refusing to 
read Lone Wolf as sanctioning any arbitrary move Congress may choose to make with respect to 
property rights of Indians created by treaty).  Id.  Instead, only such moves as are purported (i.e., 
shown by the published record) to provide an “adequate consideration” in any exchange of lands for 
anything else [would be found as coming within Lone Wolf]. 
 157 See also Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1701 (2002); Maine 
Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1711 (2002). 
 158 Jaeger v. United States, 27 Ct. Cl. 278, 282 (1892) (stating that “The civil rights incident 
to States and individuals . . . have not been accorded either to Indian nations, tribes, or Indians”); 
see Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 332 (1892) (showing that until the Sioux became citizens of the 
United States in 1887, they were incapable of suing in any of the courts of the United States). 
 159 While white citizens were permitted to sue the federal government under the Tucker Act, 
Indian tribes were not.  24 Stat. 505. 
 160 Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 9, 12 Stat. 765, 767. 
 161 See discussion in Sioux Nation, infra; Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United 
States, 324 U.S. 335 (1945). 
 162 The Supreme Court first closed the courthouse doors to Indian tribes in Cherokee Nation 
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), where it ruled that Indian tribes were not foreign states so as 
not to give the federal courts jurisdiction. 
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federal courts,163  they were relegated to often hostile state courts.164 
It took nearly a century of effort by the Sioux Nation to win a 
federal judicial forum for the resolution of their land claims under treaty.  
They had maintained all this time that the United States had breached the 
Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 under which the United States pledged that 
the Great Sioux Reservation that included the Black Hills of South 
Dakota, would be “set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and 
occupation” of the Sioux.165  Although the government had wind of the 
news of the discovery of gold in the Black Hills and knew that white 
prospectors were invading the reservation land, it did nothing to secure 
the reservation borders.166  Indeed, as the influx of miners increased, the 
government decided to obtain for all citizens the right to mine the Black 
Hills for gold in total abrogation of the Treaty.  Toward that end, the 
Secretary of Interior appointed a commission to negotiate with the Sioux 
for the purchase of the Black Hills.  The Sioux refused to sell for less 
 
 163 In 1966, a federal court jurisdictional act, 28 U.S.C. § 1362, granted district courts 
original jurisdiction in all civil actions arising under federal law and brought by any federally 
recognized Indian tribe or land, and removed all jurisdictional barriers to federal court.  When read 
in conjunction with the Indian commerce clause, it effected a waiver of state sovereign immunity in 
suits brought by Indian tribes. 
 164 See, e.g., Onondaga Nation v. Thacher, 62 N.E. 1098 (N.Y. 1901) (per curiam); Johnson 
v. Long Island R.R., 56 N.E. 992 (N.Y. 1900); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); 
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 464 F.2d 916, 923, n. 9 (2d Cir. 1972), rev’d on other 
grounds, 414 U.S. 661, 678 (1974). 
 165 Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 374 (1980).  “The Fort Laramie Treaty was concluded at the 
culmination of the Powder River War of 1866-67,” in which the Sioux fought to protect the integrity 
of earlier-recognized treaty lands (Treaty of September 17, 1851) and included all of the present 
State of South Dakota, and parts of what is now Nebraska, Wyoming, North Dakota, and Montana.  
Id.  The reservation also included  a narrow strip of land west of the Missouri River and north of the 
border between North and South Dakota.  Id. at 375 n.2.  In the treaty, the United States “‘solemnly 
[agreed]’ that no unauthorized persons ‘shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in 
[this] territory.’”  Id. at 375.  In addition, the United States “permitted members of the Sioux tribes 
to select lands within the reservation for cultivation” and to assist them in becoming farmers, the 
United States “promised to provide necessary services and materials, and with subsistence rations 
for four years.”  Id. at 375.  “The treaty called for the construction of schools, the provision of 
teachers for the education of Indian children, the provision of seeds, agricultural instruments . . . the 
provision of blacksmiths, carpenters, millers, and engineers” as well as “certain articles of clothing” 
to each Sioux once per year for thirty years and an annual stipend of $10 per person for all members 
of the Sioux nation who continued to engage in hunting and $20 to those who settled on the 
reservation to engage in farming.  Id. at 375 n. 3.  In exchange, the Sioux “agreed to relinquish their 
rights under [an earlier treaty], to occupy territories outside the reservation,” while reserving their 
“right to hunt on any lands north of North Platte and on the Republican Fork of the Smoky Hill 
River, so long as the buffalo may range thereon in such numbers as to justify the chase.”  Id. at 375.  
They also agreed to withdraw “opposition to the building of railroads that did not pass over their 
reservation land, not to engage in attacks on settlers, and to withdraw their opposition to the military 
posts and roads that had been established south of the North Platte River.”  Id. at 375-76. 
 166 Id. at 378. 
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than $70 million.  The commission offered an annual rental of $400,000 
or $6 million for absolute relinquishment.  As the negotiations broke 
down,167 the United States employed the additional leverage of 
threatening to withhold appropriations for the subsistence provisions it 
was obligated to provide under the Treaty.168  The Sioux succumbed.  
Although the original Treaty required that a cession of lands within the 
reservation be accomplished by the joinder of three-fourths of the adult 
male Sioux, the treaty of cession was presented only to Sioux chiefs and 
their leading men and was signed by only ten percent of the adult 
males.169  In 1877, Congress ratified the agreement which formally 
abrogated the Fort Laramie Treaty.170 
Whatever the Sioux’s desire to protest the irregularities in the 
cession of the Black Hills, at the time there was no avenue for judicial 
redress.  Fifty-three years later, in 1920, Congress enacted a special 
jurisdictional act that provided a forum, a claims court, for the 
adjudication of claims by Native Americans against the United States 
under any treaties.171  In 1923, the Sioux filed a petition in that claims 
court seeking compensation for the taking of the Black Hills172 and 
alternatively for a breach of the government’s fiduciary duty as trustee 
of their reservation lands.  It was not until 1942 after many procedural 
maneuvers, that a unanimous court dismissed the claim on the ground 
that the 1920 Act did not authorize suit challenging the adequacy of the 
price paid for the Black Hills and that the Sioux’ claim in that regard 
was but a “moral” claim.173 
In 1946, Congress reversed that ruling with the passage of the 
Indian Claims Commission Act,174 which created a new forum to hear 
 
 167 Id. at 378-79. 
 168 Id. at 381.  Historians have recounted that starvation and near starvation conditions 
existed among the Sioux because of the poor quality and insufficient amounts of rations.  Id. at 381 
n.11. 
 169 Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 381-82.  The agreement “altered the boundaries of the Great 
Sioux Reservation by adding some 900,000 acres of land to the north, while carving out virtually all 
that portion of the reservation . . . [that] include[ed] the Black Hills, an area well over 7 million 
acres.  [The Sioux] also relinquished their rights to hunt in the unceded lands recognized by the Fort 
Laramie Treaty, and agreed that three wagon roads could be cut through their reservation.”  Id. at 
383. 
 170 Id. at 382-83. 
 171 Id. at 384-85. 
 172 Id. at 385. 
 173 Id. at 384.  That ruling followed the reasoning of Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 553. 
 174 Act of Aug. 8, 1946, ch. 907, 60 Stat. 939.  The intent of the Act was to settle once and 
for all the claims arising from the government’s historical dealings with the Indians.  The Act gave 
the Commission jurisdiction over five kinds of claims: 1) those in law or equity arising under the 
Constitution, laws, treaties of the United States; 2) all other claims in law and equity, including 
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and determine all tribal grievances that had previously arisen.  The Sioux 
re-filed the Black Hills claim to that Commission.175  It was not until 
1974, after another long period of procedural wrangling, that the 
Commission ruled in favor of the Sioux.  The Commission held the 
claim was not barred by res judicata by the 1942 decision, as the 
government had argued, and because Congress had acted pursuant to its 
power of eminent domain when it passed the 1877 Act abrogating the 
Fort Laramie Treaty, rather than as a trustee for the Sioux, the 
government was obligated to pay just compensation.176  It was a taking 
and not a mere exercise of the power of a trustee to transmute the nature 
of the trust res, because Congress had made no effort to give the Sioux 
full value for the ceded reservation lands.  The only new obligation 
assumed was a promise to provide the Sioux with subsistence rations, 
but that obligation was subject to several limiting conditions.  Also the 
consideration given the Indians had no relationship to the value of the 
property acquired and “there was no indication in the record that 
Congress ever attempted to relate the value of the rations to the value of 
the Black Hills.”177 
On appeal, the Court of Claims agreed with the government that the 
takings claim was barred by the res judicata effects of its 1942 decision 
and reversed the Commission’s ruling on that point.178  This still left for 
consideration the award due under the alternative claim, breach of 
fiduciary duty, the ruling on which the government failed to appeal.  The 
Sioux would be entitled to damages, but no interest on those damages179 
 
those sounding in tort; 3) claims which would result if the treaties, contracts and agreements 
between the Indians and the United States were revised on the ground of fraud, duress, 
unconscionable consideration, mutual or unilateral mistake, whether of law or fact, and any other 
ground cognizable by a court of equity; 4) claims arising from a taking by the United States; and 5) 
claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that were not recognized by any existing rule of law 
or equity.  The Commission was authorized to hear only those tribal claims that had accrued prior to 
the enactment of the Act.  § 12, 60 Stat. 1052  Neither a statute of limitations nor the defense of 
laches was to apply to claims otherwise permissible under the Act. § 2, 60 Stat. 1050.  Although the 
Act did not explicitly limit recoveries to monetary awards, courts read in such a limitation.  Seneca 
Nation v. New York, 26 F. Supp. 2d 555, 573-74 (W.D. N.Y. 1998). 
 175 “The Commission initially ruled that the Sioux had failed to prove their case” but that 
decision was vacated by the Court of Claims which directed the Commission to reopen the case for 
consideration of additional evidence.  Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 385. 
 176  Id. at 385-86. 
 177  Id. at 386. 
 178 United States v. Sioux Nation, 518 F.2d 1298 (Claims 1975). 
 179 Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 387.  The Court of Claims noted that by subsequent legislation, 
“the Government would no longer be entitled to an offset from any judgment eventually awarded 
the Sioux based on its appropriations for subsistence rations in the years following passage of the 
1877 Act.”  Id. at 387 n.1. 
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(at least $17.5 million for the lands surrendered and for the gold taken by 
trespassing prospectors prior to the 1877 Act).180   
In 1978, Congress passed yet more legislation, this one providing 
for Court of Claims’ review of the merits of the Sioux’ takings claim 
without regard to the defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel 
allowing for review of the merits de novo.181  Sitting en banc, the Court 
of Claims, “affirmed the Commission’s holding that the 1877 Act 
effected a taking of the Black Hills and of rights-of-way across the 
reservation” which gave the Sioux the right to compensation with 
interest.182  That award was five per cent, per annum, on the principal 
sum of $17.1 million, dating from 1877.183 
V.  LEGAL AND EQUITABLE TIME BARS TO SPECIFIC RELIEF 
“The Sioux did not claim that Congress was without power to take 
the Black Hills . . . in contravention of the Fort Laramie Treaty, . . . [but] 
only that [it] could not do so inconsistently with the command of the 
Fifth Amendment to pay just compensation for the taking.”184  Still, the 
Sioux have refused to accept the monetary award, insisting upon the 
return of the land.  This specific relief sought is impossible given the 
substantive claim of a taking.185  In the case first mentioned in this paper, 
 
 180  Id. at 388; United States v. Sioux Nation 518 F.2d at 1302.  “The court also remarked 
upon President Grant’s duplicity in breaching the Government’s treaty obligation to keep 
trespassers out of the Black Hills, and the pattern of duress practiced by the Government on the 
starving Sioux to get them to agree to the sale of the Black Hills.”  Id.  “‘A more ripe and rank case 
of dishonorable dealings will never, in all probability, be found in our history, which is not, taken as 
a whole, the disgrace it now pleases some persons to believe.’”  Id.  The Sioux’ petition for 
certiorari was denied.  Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 388.  The case went back to the Indian Claims 
Commission where the value of the rights of way obtained by the government through the 1877 Act 
was determined to be $3,484.  Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 388. 
 181  Id. at 389.  Pub. L. 95-243, 92 Stat. 153 (1978). 
 182  Id. at 389.  The court reversed the ruling by the Commission that the mining by 
prospectors prior to 1877 also constituted a taking, therefore “the value of gold [taken] could not be 
considered as part of the principal on which interest would be paid to the Sioux.”  Id. at 390 n.19. 
 183  Id. at 390.  The Supreme Court affirmed.  Id. at 424.  In so ruling, the Court approved the 
lower court’s application of the good faith effort test: that in determining whether Congress has 
acted in the capacity of a trustee having paramount power over the Sioux property (which would not 
give rise to takings liability) or whether Congress was exercising its powers of eminent domain, 
would be based on whether Congress made a good faith effort to give the Sioux full value of their 
lands, thus merely transmuting the property from land to money, in which case, there would be no 
taking.  Id. at 416-17. 
 184 Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 411 n.27. 
 185 See generally, Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 272 U.S. 351 (1926).  There, the 
Supreme Court refused to order rescission of a cession of land by the Sioux to the United States 
where the United States had failed to perform as agreed.  Id.  Under a treaty, the Sioux ceded certain 
lands, but reserved the “free and unrestricted use of the Red Pipe-Stone quarry, or so much thereof 
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the Cayuga have alleged a wrongful dispossession by private parties in 
violation of federal law and are seeking specific relief, which is not only 
not impossible for the court to grant, but given the nature of the 
substantive right involved, is the required remedy.   
A.  Specific Relief and Substitutionary Relief 
Remedies have the basic goal of putting the plaintiff in the position 
he would have been in had the injury not occurred.  They are a means of 
carrying into effect the substantive right.  As a general proposition, the 
remedy for a particular injury should reflect the right and the policy 
behind that right as precisely as possible.  The proposition is said to 
apply to both the selection of a remedy and to its measurement and, if 
justice is to be done, a court in formulating the right remedy must 
understand the nature and scope of the substantive right as well as the 
substantive law and policy.  The two broad choices lay before a court: 
specific relief and substitutionary relief.186  While specific relief, in 
which the thing originally lost or bargained for is restored, may often be 
the preferred form, it may be impossible for the court to grant, say, if the 
thing sought to be recovered has been consumed or destroyed, is no 
longer under the defendant’s control, or involved the performance of 
some act by the defendant.  Substitutionary relief, in the form of 
 
as they have been accustomed to frequent and use for the purpose of procuring stone for pipes; and 
the United States . . . keep it open and free to the Indians to visit and procure stone for pipes so long 
as they shall desire.”  Id. at 353-54.  Whether by these provisions the Sioux acquired full ownership 
of the tract was in question for some time, the United States collecting and awarding to the Sioux 
damages for a taking of the strip for railroad purposes and later constructing an Indian industrial 
school on it.  Id. at 354.  More than thirty years after the first treaty, the Sioux made a cession of an 
additional 150,000 acres of land.  Id. at 354-55.  In part consideration of the cession, the agreement 
provided that if the government questioned the ownership of the Pipestone Reservation by the Sioux 
under the earlier treaty, the Secretary of the Interior should as speedily as possible refer the matter 
to the Supreme Court to be decided and the Secretary’s failure to do so within one year after the 
ratification of this later treaty, would be construed as a waiver by the United States of all rights to 
the ownership of the Pipestone Reservation.  Id. at 355.  The Secretary made no attempt to refer the 
matter and the Attorney General later advised that compliance would be impracticable.  Id.  A few 
years later, Congress believing that title had vested in the Sioux directed the Secretary to negotiate 
with the Sioux for the purchase of the land.  Id. at 355.  An agreement was negotiated but a 
congressional committee recommended against it.  Id. at 356.  The Sioux sued for compensation for 
the misappropriation.  Id.  The Supreme Court upheld the claim, rejecting the defense of 
impossibility (because the matter could not be referred to the Supreme Court) inasmuch as the 
agreement provided for an alternative consequence (vesting in fee in the Indians).  Id.  While the 
Sioux did not expressly seek recovery of the land, the court stated “[i]t is impossible, however, to 
rescind the cession and restore the Indians to their former rights because the lands have been opened 
to settlement and large portions of them are now in the possession of innumerable innocent 
purchasers. . . .” Id. at 357. 
 186 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 1 (2d ed. 1993). 
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damages, that is, monetary compensation, may be all that is within the 
court’s practical power.  This is often the case in breach of contract 
actions, where damages are awarded for loss of bargain and are 
calculated to make the injured party whole in an economic sense.187   
The loss to the injured party is considered a fungible thing in the 
sense that money is deemed capable of providing full relief by satisfying 
the economic objective of the contract or giving the injured party the 
resources deemed sufficient to go out into the marketplace to find a 
suitable replacement for the thing that was the object of the original 
contract.  Where the loss is not a fungible thing, damages may be 
inadequate.  This is often the case with a contract for the purchase of real 
property, where courts usually will grant specific performance rather 
than damages for breach, on the premise that every parcel of real 
property is unique.188  In the same vein, one who already owns land, but 
who has been wrongfully dispossessed usually will seek and be granted 
the specific relief of being restored to possession and to have the court 
officially recognize and declare his title (as well as to recover damages 
for the use value of the land during the period of the dispossession).  The 
traditional method for achieving these forms of relief is the action in 
ejectment.189 
The importance of the cause of action of ejectment and its 
predecessor causes190 in the English common law property system 
cannot be overstated.  It would not be out of line to say that it was 
required as the fulfillment of the idea of property.  As the Supreme Court 
put it: 
The common law of England was . . . as it still is . . . that a right to 
land, by that law, includes the right to enter on it, when the possession 
is withheld from the right owner; to recover possession by suit.*** [A] 
law which denies to the owner of land a remedy to recover possession 
of it, when withheld by any person, however innocently he may have 
obtained it . . . impairs his right to, and interest in, the property.  If 
 
 187 11 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 992 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 1979) (2002). 
 188 This premise has been questioned by courts.  See, e.g., Centex Homes Corp. v. Boag, 320 
A.2d 194 (N.J. Super. 1974). 
 189 At one time, a plaintiff was required to bring a separate suit for damages which were 
traditionally called mesne profits.  The second action is not now required and the damages claim can 
be asserted in the ejectment action. 
 190 MILSOM, supra note 53, at 137.  The action in ejectment made its first appearance in the 
16th century as an action available to leaseholders, but later extended to freeholders, thereby 
replacing the ancient and cumbersome real actions of writ of right, assize of novel disseisin, writ of 
entry and assize of mort d’ancestor, which all gave possessory remedies.  Id. at 124-49.  See also F. 
W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 
Cambridge University Press, 1962) (1909). 
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there be no remedy to recover possession, the law necessarily 
presumes a want of right to it.191 
Protecting possession, the law affirms ownership.192  As to 
aboriginal title, which is possession, the Supreme Court has recognized 
an unquestionable right by its holders to maintain an action in ejectment 
to recover lands covered by that title.193 
B.  Time Bars 
Though the law provides protection to possession, protection is 
only available when it is sought and is not precluded by defenses a 
defendant may set up, such as the running of the statute of limitations.  
Defenses, like causes of action, arise in forms that are either legal or 
equitable,194 and while in a single civil action, legal and equitable 
defenses may be combined, the defining character of a defense still has 
significance in the law.195  Equitable defenses, as the characterization 
suggests, exist solely by virtue of equitable principles, and originally 
were recognized only by courts of equity.  Generally, in actions that are 
wholly legal, an equitable defense may not be set up to defeat a strictly 
legal cause.196  The defendant’s assertion of an equitable defense does 
not change the character of the action or abridge the plaintiff’s rights.197  
 
 191 Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 74-76 (1823) (involving a writ of right). 
 192 Possession from ownership means the right to exclude.  Blackstone grandly defined the 
right of property as “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the 
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”  
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 2.  Two centuries later, the Supreme Court would 
describe the right to exclude as the essential feature of property.  Kaiser Aetna  v. United States, 444 
U.S. 164, 176 (1979). 
 193 Marsh v. Brooks, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 223 (1850); see also Oneida Indian Nation v. Oneida, 
414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974).  Incidental to that right to ejectment is the right to an accounting of all 
rents, issues and profits against trespassers and wrongful possessors.  United States v. Santa Fe 
Pacific R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941); Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 366 (1856) 
(discussing an action for trespass based upon recognized title); Creek Nation v. United States, 318 
U.S. 629, 640 (1943) (determining that Indian tribes have an extrastatutory, “general legal right . . . 
to bring actions on their own behalf to collect unpaid rents on tribal lands). 
 194 JOHN N. POMEROY, 4 EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1368, 1369 (4th ed. 1919). 
 195 Edward Yorio, A Defense of Equitable Defenses, 51 OHIO STATE LAW J. 1201 (1990). 
 196 Oneida v. Oneida Indian Tribe, 470 U.S. at 245; United States v. Robbins, 819 F. Supp. 
672 (E.D. Mi. 1993) (stating that laches, as a general rule, remains inapplicable to legal claims for 
damages); Golotrade Shipping & Chartering, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 706 F. Supp. 214, 220 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); DOBBS, REMEDIES at § 2.3(1). 
 197 Dunbar v. Green, 198 U.S. 166, 170 (1905); See also Sun Oil Co. v. Fleming, 469 F.2d 
211, 214 (2d Cir. 1972).  The court stated: “[I]t is the rule that if the law affords a remedy and that 
remedy is adequate, the cause may not be made the basis of a suit in equity.  The gravamen of . . . 
[the] claim is its demand for possession. . . .  The legal action of ejectment is the proper remedy for 
the recovery of possession under such circumstances. . . .  It follows that the equitable defense of 
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As it relates to the issues discussed here, despite a defendant’s assertion 
of an equitable claim or defense, ejectment, an action at law brought by 
the plaintiff, must be tried at law.  In actions at law, whether a right 
holder has delayed too long in asserting the claim is determined by the 
words of a statute of limitation.  If an action is brought the day before 
the statutory time expires, it will be sustained; if a day after, it will be 
defeated.  Thus laches, an equitable time bar, established by the “neglect 
to assert a right or claim which, taken together with lapse of time and 
other circumstances caus[es] prejudice to [the] adverse party,”198cannot 
defeat plaintiff’s legal claim.  Conversely, where a right holder seeks 
equitable relief, that relief may be barred because of delay depending 
upon the circumstances of each particular case.199  Large conflicts of 
policy and pragmatism arise if laches, a judge-made defense, is allowed 
to operate without regard to the statute of limitations.  One of the large 
policy conflicts is that a statute of limitation reflects the judgment of 
lawmakers as to what is a reasonable time within which to assert a right 
and the most desirable ends sought by the allowance of that prescribed 
period.  The operative fiction is that because equity acts in personam, 
enjoining a party to do what in conscience is right, does not interfere 
with law, and hence does not disturb the underlying legislative 
judgments.  But it is a fiction if a particular plaintiff otherwise within her 
rights, because of equity’s injunction, is denied those rights and benefits 
of law. 
Yet, to some, the question remains whether laches, where it cannot 
bar the legal action, can bar a request for specific legal relief.  In other 
words, does the inapplicability of the statute of limitations and laches to 
a cause of action also mean that they cannot bar a particular relief?  
Alternatively, if no time bar applies to the right holder, so as to preclude 
the action in either law or equity, is the application of laches to bar 
 
laches cannot prevail.”  Id.  See further, United States v. Nix, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1591 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995) (holding that non-Indian  who had no right to occupy Indian land, subject to ejectment); 
Banner v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 568, 576 (1999) (involving 3000 individual lessees, whose 99 
year leases on Indian land had expired, but not renewed, were unlawfully on the land and therefore 
subject to ejectment; the court rejecting the suggestion of a property right to renew the leases), aff’d 
Banner v. United States 238 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (concerning situations where lease amounts 
were nominal, between one and ten dollars annually and did not increase over the entire 99 year 
term). 
 198 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 875 (6th ed. 1990); see also Noble v. Gallardo, 223 U.S. 65, 
66 (1912) (holding that change of position on the faith of other party’s aquiesence along with lapse 
of time required for laches). 
 199 Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U.S. 309, 317 (1904) (affirming denial of equitable relief on the 
basis of laches, even though the limitations period, which by statute was applicable to actions in 
both law and equity, had not expired). 
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specific legal relief the same as barring the action?  The answer to both 
questions should be yes.  If the cause of action by its definition calls for 
one form of legal relief, denying that relief is the same as barring the 
action.  If the action cannot be barred because the statute of limitations 
and laches do not apply, the claimants must be granted the specific legal 
relief demanded.  In this respect, the Cayuga decision,200denying the 
claimant’s specific demands of ejectment, was wrong. 
These conclusions are particularly compelling when the right holder 
is a sovereign.  The basis for this position begins with a consideration of 
the common law principle “nullum tempus occurrit regi,”201 that neither 
laches nor statutes of limitations will bar the sovereign.202  Courts 
adopted the rule, not on the theory that an “impeccable” sovereign could 
not be guilty of laches, but because of the public policies served by the 
doctrine, in particular, the public interest in preserving public rights and 
property from injury and loss attributable to the negligence of public 
officers and agents, through whom the public must act.203  The policy 
has particular meaning in the case of lands held in trust for the public, 
the interests of the sovereign are so widespread and varied, that the 
vigilance required in protecting rights of private parties is hindered.  Yet 
the public must not lose its rights because of the constraints on the 
sovereign. 
If a contrary rule were sanctioned, it would only be necessary for 
intruders upon the public lands to maintain their possessions, until the 
statute of limitations shall run; and then they would become invested 
with the title against the government, and all persons claiming under 
it. . . .  It is only necessary, therefore, to state the case, in order to show 
the wisdom and propriety of the rule that the statute never operates 
against the government.204 
No matter how much time has passed, the federal government as 
well as state sovereigns cannot be precluded from recovering their lands 
from wrongful possessors.205  Similarly, in the case of aboriginal lands, 
 
 200 No. 80-CV-930, 80-CV-960, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10579 (N.D.N.Y. 1999), at * 98-99. 
 201 “No time runs against the King.” 
 202 Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 294 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 203  Id. 
 204 Lindsey v. Lessee of Miller, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 666, 673 (1832); accord, Guaranty Trust Co. 
v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 133 (1938); Weber v. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, 85 U.S. 57 (1873); 
United States v. Knight, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 301, 314 (1840); quoted in Block, 461 U.S. at 295 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Texas v. Louisiana, 410 U.S. 702 (1973); Armstrong v. Morrill, 
81 U.S. 120 (1871). 
 205 Illinois v. Kentucky, 500 U.S. 380, 388 (1991) (noting that laches defense is generally 
inapplicable against a state); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484 (1988).  The 
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the centuries that have passed do not bar an assertion of a claim to 
ownership of lands wrongfully possessed by others.  There is no statute 
of limitations to preclude actions initiated by Indian Tribes to establish 
title to, or the right of possession to, real or personal property.  The 
federal statute that prescribes a limitations period for certain actions for 
money damages brought by the United States on behalf of recognized 
Indian tribes,206 expressly excludes from its coverage actions for title 
brought Indian tribes.207  Aboriginal land rights are founded in federal 
common law.  Thus, under principles of constitutional supremacy state 
law time bars, adverse possession rules and equitable principles of 
laches cannot apply of their own force to debar them.208  The normal rule 
of borrowing of an analogous state rule in the absence of a controlling 
federal limitations rule cannot apply either because that would be 
inconsistent with the federal policy that Indian land claims not be limited 
by time.209  In its freedom from time bars, aboriginal title corresponds to 
title held by a sovereign.210 
 
Court accepted the ruling by the state supreme court that “[t]he fact that petitioners have long been 
the record title holders, or long paid taxes on these lands does not change the outcome . . . [T]he 
State’s ownership of these lands could not be lost via adverse possession, laches, or any equitable 
doctrine.”  Id.  The case involved 42 acres underlying a river and 11 small drainage streams; the 
disputed tracts ranged from under one-half to almost ten acres.  Id. at 472.  See generally, 
Annotation, Acquisition by adverse possession or use of public property held by municipal 
corporations or other governmental unit otherwise than for streets, alleys, parks, or common, 55 
A.L.R.2d 554 (1957). 
 206 28 U.S.C. § 2415. 
 207 28 U.S.C. § 2415(c). 
 208 Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 240 (1985) (“Oneida II”); Board of 
County Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1939) (defenses based on delay in 
bringing claims such as laches and estoppel are inapplicable to claims to enforce Indian rights); 
Swim v. Bergland, 696 F. 2d 712, 718 (9th Cir. 1983) (neither laches nor estoppel is available to 
defeat Indian treaty rights); Oneida Nation v. Sherrill, 145 F.Supp. 2d 226 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (laches 
would not bar suit by Indians or by the United States on behalf of Indians to protect their rights to 
their lands and federal policy that preclude laches also precludes waiver and estoppel defenses); 
Oneida Indian Nation v. Oneida, 434 F. Supp. 527, 542 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (laches would not bar the 
suit); Seneca Nation v. New York, 26 F. Supp. 2d 555, 572-73 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)(laches not a bar to 
Indian land claims, citing Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 691 F.2d 1070, 1084 (2d Cir. 1982), 
as rejecting all delay-based defenses founded on federal law). 
 209 Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 240.  Indeed, “[i]n adopting the statute that gave jurisdiction over 
civil actions involving Indians to the New York courts, Congress included” a proviso that the act 
should not be “construed as conferring jurisdiction on the Courts of the State of New York or 
making applicable the laws of the state of New York” on actions “involving Indian lands or claims 
with respect thereto.”  Id. at 241.  That proviso was “added specifically to ensure that the New York 
statute of limitations would not apply to pre-1952 land claims.”  Id. 
 210 In fact, Indian Tribes from our earliest history, have been regarded as “domestic 
dependent nations” that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories.”  
Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band of Potawatoni Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991) 
(quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (5 Pet. 1) (1831)).  “Suits against Indian are thus 
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While the general rule is that time bars do not apply to a sovereign.  
Some cases, though, make a distinction between lands held by a 
sovereign in a proprietary capacity and as trustee.  In the former, time 
may run against the sovereign.211 As to the Indians’ right of occupancy, 
the national sovereign is said to hold the fee simple title,212 holding 
Indian lands in trust for them.213  Yet, as a kind of paradox, that trustee 
has the power to extinguish the Indians’ right in those lands without 
consequent liability for compensation.214  Although if the sovereign fails 
 
barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation.”  Id. at 
509 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)).  There was a longstanding 
history of treaty making with the Indians and treaties entered into with the Indians were on the same 
level as treaties entered into with other foreign nations.  Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 
(1832). See Kristen A. Carpenter, Symposium: Native American Sovereignty Issues: Interpreting 
Indian Country in State of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 35 TULSA L.J. 73, 96 (1999). For 
some time, the federal trust responsibility was used to justify Congressional power over Indians.  In 
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), on the basis of the guardianship theory, the Court 
confirmed Congress’ “plenary” power over Indians.  Id.  Later it established and protected rights of 
Indian tribes and individuals, to the extent it requires the fulfillment by Congress of obligations to 
Indians, the application of the Indian canons in interpreting treaties, statutes and other lawmaking 
affecting Indians, and the evaluation of the conduct of executive agencies under strict fiduciary 
standards.  Cohen, supra note 111, at 49; United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391 (1973); Seminole 
Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 
(1938); Navajo Nation v. United States, 263 F.3d 1325, 1329-41 (Fed Cir. 2001), discussing United 
States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (Mitchell I); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) 
(Mitchell II); Brown v. United States, 86 F.3d 1554 (Fed Cir. 1996); See also Cohen, supra note 55, 
at 49.  Carpenter, supra at 127, asserts that this conception of Indians as dependent and as wards 
was entirely Eurocentric and a handy tool for subjugation. It cast Indians as non-actors, incapable of 
managing their own affairs, which thus determined the federal government’s approach to Indian 
affairs, despite real evidence of economic enterprise, vital governments, and thriving cultural 
practices.  Id. . . .  In fact, “‘wardship’ is not now, and may have never been, an accurate description 
of Indians’ status in relation to the federal government.”  Id.  It may be understood “as an example 
of the ‘patriarchal terminology that white Americans [of Chief Justice Marshall’s] generation 
typically used in translating the language of Indian forest diplomacy.’”  Id.  “[D]uring the past 
several centuries, the tribes and the federal government have been dependent on one another in 
ways that ‘ward’ and ‘guardian’ do not capture.”  Id.  Carpenter argues for “Indigenous Indian 
Law,” as an “attempt to identify existing and developing theories and practices which indigenous 
peoples can use to address their legal problems. . . . ‘[A] sound contemporary Indian policy must 
recognize that the Indian way is very much  alive and well.’”  Id. at 115-16. 
 211 See Weber v. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, 85 U.S. 57, 68 (1873) (“Where lands are held by 
the State simply for sale or other disposition, and not as sovereign in trust for the public, there is 
some reasons in requiring the assertion of her rights within a limited period”); American Trading 
Real Estate Prop., Inc. v. Trumbull, 574 A.2d 796 (Conn. 1990); Devins v. Bogota, 592 A.2d 199 
(N.J. 1991); Siejack v. Baltimore, 313 A.2d 843 (Md. 1974). 
 212 Cohen, supra, note 55. 
 213 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).  The federal government-Indian 
relationship in respect of their lands is regarded as that of “trustee-ward.”  Although the 
philosophical foundations of this relationship is somewhat unclear, the first judicial expression of it 
appears in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) (1831). 
 214 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955). 
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to carry out its obligations as trustee, it can be liable to damages.215  
Because the sovereign is not free to deal in aboriginal lands without 
accountability, but is obligated, at least until aboriginal title is 
extinguished, to hold those lands in good faith in the Indians’ interest, 
the exception to the principle of nullum tempus occurrit regi (regarding 
lands held by the sovereign in a proprietary capacity) should not 
apply.216  Accordingly, that radical fee simple title held by the national 
sovereign, subject to the Indians’ right of occupancy, must to the same 
extent and for the same reasons be exempt from time bars. 
The Supreme Court said as much in Heckman v. United States,217 
where as to lands that had been allotted to individual tribal members, the 
Court ruled that the protection of Indian lands involved public, not 
merely private, rights.  The government had sought and was permitted to 
seek the cancellation of some 30,000 conveyances, affecting some 
16,000 defendants because they were of Cherokee lands that by statute 
were inalienable.  As guardians for the Indians, it was the duty of the 
government to enforce by all appropriate means the restrictions designed 
for the security of the Indians.218  The Court explained that a transfer of 
the allotments was not simply a violation of the proprietary rights of the 
Indians, but also a “violation of the rights of the United States. . . .  
Indeed, the essence of the right of the United States to interfere in the . . . 
case [was] its obligation to protect the public from the monopoly of the 
patent which was procured by fraud.”219 
In Board of County Commr’s v. United States,220 the Court also 
described Indians’ land rights as federal rights, which a state would not 
 
 215 Sioux Nation v. United States, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). 
 216 It is also the largely held view that lands held by a sovereign, e.g., state, which by its 
constitution or a statute, is precluded from alienating state lands, cannot be acquired by adverse 
possession while the state holds title to them.  See e.g., Smith v. People, 193 N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1959); Binghamton v. Monserrate, 419 N.Y.S.2d 253 (‘N.Y. App. Div. 1979); 
Tonawanda v. Ellicott Creek Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 449 N.Y.S.2d 116 (‘N.Y. App. Div. 1982); 
Hinkley v. State, 137 N.E. 599 (N.Y. 1922); People v. Douglass, 216 N.Y.S. 785 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1926); People v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 179 Cal. 537, 147 P. 274 (Cal. 1915). 
 217 224 U.S. 413 (1912). 
 218 Id. at 437. 
 219 Id. at 438-39.  The Court discussed, among others, in support of its ruling United States v. 
Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 444 (1903), where it was pointed out that in a suit by the government to 
restrain the collection of certain county taxes on structures on Indian lands, “the decision [finding a 
sufficient governmental interest to maintain the suit] rested upon a broader foundation than the mere 
holding of a legal title to land in trust, and embraced the recognition of the interest of the United 
States in securing immunity to the Indians from taxation conflicting with the measures it had 
adopted for their protection.  Heckman, 224 U.S. at 441.  The United States was entitled to recover 
without compensation to the displaced landowners.  Id. 
 220 308 U.S. 343. 
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be allowed to infringe.  In protecting these rights, “federal courts [were] 
not restricted to the remedies available in state courts in enforcing such 
federal rights . . . . and [s]tate [law] notions of laches and state statutes of 
limitations [had] no applicability to suits by the Government, whether on 
behalf of Indians or otherwise.”221 
Speaking on the applicability of laches to a claim brought directly 
by the Oneida where there was a 175 year delay in asserting the claim, 
the Supreme Court said in Oneida II:222 
[The] application of the equitable defense of laches in an action at law 
would be novel indeed. . . .  [T]he equitable doctrine of laches, 
developed and designed to protect good-faith transactions against those 
who have slept on their rights, with knowledge and ample opportunity 
to assert them, cannot properly have application to give vitality to a 
void deed and to bar the rights of Indian wards in land subject to 
statutory restrictions.223 
To bar ejectment and hence specific relief, on the basis of laches 
would be tantamount to an extinguishment of aboriginal title, and thus 
contrary to the requirement that an extinguishment of Indian title reflect 
a clear and intentional sovereign act.224  The Court concluded: “it is 
 
 221 Id. at 350-51. 
 222 470 U.S. 226 (1985).  There, the Oneida Indian Nation of New York, the Oneida Indian 
Nation of Wisconsin and the Oneida of the Thames Band Council sued the Counties of Oneida and 
Madison, New York, for damages representing the fair rental value of the land when it was 
occupied by the defendants.  Id. at 229.  The plaintiffs’ ancestors had conveyed 100,000 acres to the 
State of New York under a 1795 agreement that violated the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1793 
(Non-Intercourse Act), such that the transaction was void.  Id.  In 1795, the State of New York 
entered into the agreement at issue with the Oneidas whereby they conveyed virtually all of their 
remaining land to the State for annual cash payments.  Id. at 232.  While there is a statute of 
limitations that applies to certain claims brought by the United States on behalf of Indians, that 
statute specifically excludes all actions “to establish the title to, or right of possession of, real or 
personal property.”  Id. at 242, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2415(c). 
 223 Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 245 n.16, quoting Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129 (1922).  In 
Ewert, the Court upheld the granting of specific relief for the recovery of aboriginal lands despite 
the passage of decades and despite the transfer of title to otherwise good faith purchasers where the 
possessors’ claim rested upon a deed that was void because it purported to convey Indian land to a 
government official in violation of a statute that made it unlawful for him to become a purchaser of 
Indian lands while holding that position.  Id.  In general, where Congress declares certain contracts 
void, it intends that the customary legal incidence of voidness will follow, including possible 
specific relief.  See, e.g., Bunch v. Cole, 264 U.S. 250, 254 (1923) (“[L]eases made in violation of a 
congressional prohibition . . . [and are] not merely voidable at the election of the allottee, but 
absolutely void and not susceptible of ratification”); Danforth v. Wear, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 673, 675-
76 (1824) (“As to lands surveyed within the Indian boundary, this Court has never hesitated to 
consider all such surveys and grants as wholly void. . . .”); United States v. Southern Pac. Transp. 
Co., 543 F.2d 676, 698 (9th Cir. 1976) (“To give effect to an invalid attempt to convey an interest in 
tribal lands in violation of the statute . . . would undermine [the] [statute’s] purpose.”). 
 224 Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 245, citing United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 439 (1926), 
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[therefore] questionable whether laches properly could be applied.”225  
The Court continued, where the basis for the wrongfulness of the 
dispossession continued, such as where it is in violation of a statutory 
restraint on alienation (there and in Cayuga), the application of laches 
would appear to be inconsistent with the established federal policy, as 
much as the borrowing of state statutes of limitation would be.226 
To return then to the question originally posed, although stated 
slightly different, can laches apply to bar a demand for specific legal 
relief when there is no statute of limitations to bar the action?  In the 
case of property held by a sovereign in trust for the public, the answer is 
clearly no.  This should also be the answer in the case of aboriginal title, 
whose radical title is held by the sovereign in trust for Indian nations.  
 
quoting United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45-47 (1913). 
 225 Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 245 n.16. 
 226 Id.  Justice Stevens dissented in Oneida II, believing that laches could bar the Indians’ 
claim to recover their land.  Id. at 255.  He pointed out that inasmuch as the President of the United 
States assured the Chief of the Senecas that “federal law would securely protect Seneca lands from 
acquisition by any State or person,” a 175 year delay in bringing suit to avoid a 1795 conveyance 
was inexcusable.  Id.  To Justice Stevens, in the “absence of any evidence of deception, 
concealment, or interference with the Tribe’s right to assert a claim.”  Id.  Societal interests that 
always underlie statutes of repose—particularly when title to real property were at stake and should 
have barred the claim.  Id. at 255-56.  In disagreement with the rule applied, he thought that a state 
statute of limitations could not be considered ‘“inconsistent’” with federal policy “merely because 
the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation.”  Id. at 258.  But, this is a difficult proposition if 
the effect of a state law is to preclude the right guaranteed by federal law.  Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 
258.  While he thought  “that the equitable doctrine of laches, with its focus on legitimate reliance 
and inexcusable delay, best reflect[ed] the limitations principles that would have governed this 
ancient claim at common law—without requiring a historian’s inquiry into archaic limitation 
doctrines that would have governed the—claims at any specific time in the preceding two 
centuries.” Id. at 261.  He also recognized “the application of a traditional equitable defense in an 
action at law [was] something of a novelty.”  Id. at 261-62.  Believing some sort of time bar should 
apply, Justice Stevens pointed out that an equitable defense was less harsh than a straightforward 
application of a statute of limitations.  Id. at 262.  Justice Stevens stated because the claim was 
based in federal common law, not statute, there was no risk of frustrating the will of the legislature.  
Id. at 262.  But, here too, Justice Stevens ignores congressional judgment in exempting such claims 
from the statute of limitations applicable to the government.  Justice Stevens was highly critical of 
the Indians, making much of the fact that they “plainly knew or should have known that they had 
conveyed their lands . . . in violation of federal law,” yet did nothing for 175 years.”  Id. at 269.  
That they had had enough time to grow up and indeed had having learned English, developed a 
sophisticated system of tribal government, having petitioned to government for the redress of 
grievances.  The difficulty with this position is determining that point between 1795 and 1980 at 
which that they should have brought suit and beyond which they would be barred.  1820? 1920?  
The lower courts have found as “a special reason why the Indians’ property may not be lost through 
adverse possession, laches or delay,” the Nonintercourse Act, “which forbids the acquisition of 
Indian lands or of any title or claim thereto except by treaty or convention.”  United States v. 
Ahtanum Irrigation, 236 F.2d 321, 334 (9th Cir. 1956).  In general, federal government is not 
subject to defenses of laches or estoppel.  See also Oneida Nation v. Sherrill, 145 F. Supp. 2d 226 
(N.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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Because the statute of limitations and laches do not apply, specific relief 
must be granted.227  The reasons for these conclusions are plain.  Barring 
the demand for specific legal relief would wholly nullify aboriginal title, 
thus defeating public policy.  This would also create a truly anomalous 
result.  The federal government, on its own seeking to vindicate the 
Indian Tribes’ interest in exclusive possession of their lands, could at 
any time obtain specific legal relief through ejectment, but the Indian 
Tribes, in a suit on their own seeking to vindicate the exact interest, 
could be denied the same relief on the basis of laches.  If the sovereign 
could not be barred, to debar the holders of the possessory title seeking 
to vindicate the identical interest would mean denying a remedy solely 
on the basis of who the plaintiff is. It is no answer that Indians might 
still have available a declaration of their title at any time, unaffected by 
laches, as the federal statute228 permits.  Because that declaration would 
be meaningless if the land covered by the title cannot be recovered and 
that title is only about possession in the first place. 
VI.  A FLAWED ANALYSIS AND RESULT 
The Cayuga court, in formulating the appropriate remedy for the 
wrongful taking of possession of aboriginal lands, chose to apply the 
Restatement of Torts factors for redressing trespass, and not rules for 
ejectment.  In its effort to find the right course, the district court seemed 
to labor in the dark, although it need not have, as the cases just discussed 
would have been illuminating.  In its search, the court found only one 
useful decision, United States v. Imperial Irrigation,229 from the Central 
District of California, which also denied the plaintiff the specific relief 
of ejectment. But the reason ejectment was denied in Imperial Irrigation 
was because the plaintiff there did not plead it.230 That court explained 
 
 227 Brooks v. Nez Perce County, 670 F.2d 835, 837 (9th Cir. 1982) (granting specific relief 
despite a 35 year delay).  Another court in the same district relied on Oneida II to reject a laches 
defense by the government in the Seneca’s action in ejectment against the current possessors of land 
the Senecas alleged was taken from them by the state in violation of the Nonintercourse Act.  
Seneca Nation v. New York, 26 F. Supp. 2d 555, 573 (1998).  That court also relied on a Second 
Circuit opinion, Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 691 F.2d 1070, 1084 (2d Cir. 1982), which also 
rejected all “delay-based defenses” founded on federal law.”  (This case was not directly related to 
the Oneida II line of cases.) 
 228 28 U.S.C. § 2415. 
 229 799 F. Supp. 1052 (S.D. Cal. 1992). 
 230 799 F. Supp. at 1068.  There, on its own behalf and on behalf of the Torres-Martinez Band 
of Mission Indians, the government sued two water districts for continuing trespass, occurring over 
the course of 68 years when irrigation water that drained from defendant’s water project flowed into 
an inland salt water lake, raising the water level of that lake and flooding tribal lands.  Id. at 1056.  
While the complaint alleged trespass and sought an injunction, at trial, plaintiffs asked for 
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that when properly pleaded, ejectment is a cause of action available to a 
plaintiff who could not sue for trespass because he had been wrongfully 
dispossessed. In Imperial Irrigation, the cause of action was not 
available to the tribe because they were still in possession. What 
Imperial Irrigation was saying was that ejectment is not the remedy for 
trespass, which was what the pleadings and facts there had established.  
In contrast, in Cayuga, the plaintiffs have been dispossessed and have 
stated a cause of action in ejectment. Thus, while Imperial Irrigation 
correctly denied ejectment on the grounds and facts recited, it was not 
correct for Cayuga, to deny ejectment on the basis of Imperial Irrigation 
when the facts of the two cases were opposition. 
The Imperial Irrigation court went on to treat the plaintiffs’ claim 
as a request for a permanent injunction against trespass and analyzed the 
cause under factors suggested by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, for 
determining the appropriateness of an injunction against trespass.231  As 
a predicate for that position, the court stated that  “there [was] precedent 
for applying equitable factors and thereby limiting relief otherwise 
available for Indian claims.”232 The court cited two cases in support.  
First, there was Brooks v. Nez Perce County, but the ruling there was not 
nearly so broad as Imperial Irrigation supposed.233  Rather, in Brooks, 
the Ninth Circuit held that laches could be weighed by a court in the 
calculation of damages to the extent that a portion of them could be said 
to have resulted from the government’s fault where it delayed over 54 
years in bringing a claim on behalf of the Indians.  Nonetheless, the 
court in Brooks granted to the plaintiffs the specific relief they sought, 
quiet title, despite the delay.234  Imperial Irrigation also cited Oneida II, 
but only a dissenting opinion235 on an issue not decided by the Court.236  
These analytical stretches by Imperial Irrigation make the Cayuga 
court’s reliance on it unsound. 
In Cayuga, the district court gave consideration to two other cases, 
United States v. Boylan,237 and United States v. Brewer.238  Although 
 
ejectment.  Id.  That remedy was denied, the court said,  because ejectment is “a discrete cause of 
action. . . ,” which the plaintiffs had not “pled, briefed or proven.”  Id. at 1068. 
 231 Those factors are discussed infra note 256 and accompanying text. 
 232 Imperial, 799 F. Supp. at 1068. 
 233 670 F.2d 835, 837 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 234 Id. at 837.  Under 28 U.S.C. § 2415, a statute of limitations operates against the 
government seeking monetary damages. 
 235 See discussion of Justice Stevens’ dissent supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 236 799 F. Supp. at 1068. 
 237 265 F. 165 (2d Cir. 1920). 
 238 184 F. Supp. 377 (D.N.M. 1960). 
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both of those courts granted the specific relief the plaintiffs sought, 
ejectment, the Cayuga court distinguished them, in ways that were not 
entirely credible.239 Cayuga first suggested that ejectment was granted in 
the other cases because the conveyances on which the defendants’ 
possession was founded were declared void.240 However, this could not 
be a point of distinction.  This is because the root of title acquired by the 
defendant state in Cayuga was in violation of federal law, making the 
titles in all the possessors there likewise void.241  The court added that 
Boylan and Brewer did not involve land claim litigation.  But as is 
apparent from what the plaintiffs in those cases sought, the recovery of 
land, the court’s suggestion can only be described as a pretense. 
In the end, the court found the difference to be in the amount of 
land involved—some 65,000 acres in Cayuga, compared to only 32 
acres in Boylan and a mere .485 in Brewer, and in the amount of time 
the current possessors had been in possession, in Brewer and Boylan, 
“not . . . long.”242  The court described these as “critical distinctions,”“ 
which could not be ignored,243 that “justice requires that “equitable 
factors . . . be carefully weighed before any relief [was] granted.”244 
Applying the same logic, if these factors are not accepted as “critical 
distinctions,” as they are hard to perceive them as such, then the use of 
such factors as for determining whether to grant a permanent injunction 
against trespass to resolve a claim of ejectment, is false and unjust. 
The court’s reasoning regarding the application of the Restatement 
factors was otherwise skewed.  In the first place, the expectations and 
innocence of the current possessors were valued, but the same in the 
Cayuga were not.  While acknowledging the impact of the loss of 
homeland on the Cayuga’s culture and society, the court nonetheless 
pointed out that current possessors were blameless.  At the same time, 
the court also did not identify equally weighty losses on the part of the 
current possessors as would countervail the innocence of the Cayuga. 
 
 239 They also cited United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941).  The 
district court distinguished that case on the basis that it did not speak to the issue of ejectment, but 
an accounting for trespass.  Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, No. 80-CV-930, 80-CV-960, 1999 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10579, at *68. 
 240 Id. at *69-70. 
 241 See discussion of Nonintercourse Act, supra note 147-50 and accompanying text. 
 242 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10579, at *71. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. at *72.  The court stated that it “[did] not find convincing the Cayugas’ arguments 
opposing an equitable based analysis of ejectment” and pointed out that the “Cayugas [did] not offer 
an alternative way of analyzing the ejectment issue, other than to assert that they are entitled to that 
remedy.”  Id.  But, the Cayuga did, that is, with settled principles, particularly those expressed in the 
cases already.  Id. 
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Although the court found the Cayuga’s goal of reclaiming their 
homeland to be laudable, it thought a monetary award would accomplish 
this goal by enabling the Cayuga to purchase individual lots out of its 
original lands back from the wrongful possessors.245  But would that 
establish a homeland? 
The court also resolved the issue of unreasonable delay against the 
Cayuga, even though the court found that some delay by the Cayugas in 
bringing suit excusable, due to the absence of a legal forum in which 
they could have asserted the claim for most of the period of their 
dispossession. At first, the court noted, there was no forum for lodging 
such a claim, and it was not cognizable until 1972, then there were 
settlement negotiations, then suit.246 
The court determined that even though the Cayuga chose and 
argued for ejectment, monetary damages would produce results equally 
satisfactory.  There was no consideration by the court whether monetary 
damages (from the state defendant) to the current possessors would be 
equally satisfactory to them (who in any case have no legal title that 
could be the basis for any claim against the Cayuga).  Generally, in 
property law there is a presumption of uniqueness.  Nevertheless, the 
court put the burden on the Cayuga to prove that their land was “so 
unique . . . that the objectives, . . . economic, political and cultural 
development, cannot be reached without ejecting thousands upon 
thousands of landowners.”247  There was no parallel burden placed on 
the current possessors. 
Because thousands of individuals and several public utilities could 
be displaced, the court reasoned that ejectment had to be denied, because 
“two wrongs don’t make a right.”248  In the legal sense, specific relief in 
ejectment is not a wrong, but a correction of one.  Putting aside the 
question of whether the court was free to consider ejectment under the 
circumstances in the moral sense, it would be a hard case for a new 
purchaser (as many of the defendants likely are) to show that his 
entitlement is greater than the rights of the original possessor.  Surely, 
the intentional wrongdoers (the state), who constructed the electrical and 
transportation infrastructure, do not occupy that higher plane.249 
 
 245 Id. at *75. 
 246 Under the fourth factor, related misconduct, the court found the only thing worthy of 
consideration was attributable to the State and federal governments not the individual defendants 
and none on the part of the Cayuga.  Id. at *89. 
 247 Id. at *81. 
 248 Id. at *91. 
 249  Under prevailing principles, they would not even be entitled to an adjustment.  The 
district court took note of testimony about the effect ejectment would have on the area’s 
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The court was not confident of its power and ability to frame and 
enforce an ejectment order, noting that “[t]here is a very real possibility 
that if ejectment is ordered, many if not all of the defendants would 
refuse to comply with such an order.”250  Would this be the case if the 
current possessors received the monetary award the court offered the 
Cayuga?  What happens when large numbers of landowners are 
displaced where the state takes property by eminent domain? 
In the end, the court withheld specific relief because  “[a]n 
ejectment order would . . . strike at the very heart of what many in this 
country (including no doubt the individual current possessors) strive for 
years to achieve—ownership of real property.”251  Those concerns and 
more weighty ones, those about sovereignty and self-determination on 
the part of the Cayuga, loomed just as large by the denial of the order but 
were given no consideration.252 
 
transportation systems, and disruptions to it, with resultant negative consequences for the economy, 
that the local banking industry would be especially hard-hit in terms of mortgage defaults.  This 
factor weighed in favor of defendants, but it was not counterbalanced by the economic and cultural 
deprivation that the Cayuga have and will continue to experience.  While current possessors with no 
right, have enjoyed economic stability and quiet possession as a result of their apparent ownership 
of the land, the Cayuga were without such economic stability and quiet enjoyment.  Cayuga, 1999 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10579 at *92-94. 
 250 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10579 at *96. 
 251 Id. at *96.  The court also expressed some worry about “vexatious disputes in the form of 
satellite contempt proceedings—proceedings which could easily clog the federal courts well into the 
next century.”  Id. at *97. 
 252 In Chippewas v. Attorney Gen., [2000] 195 D.L.R. (4th) 135 leave to appeal dismissed, 
(2001) 205 D.L.R. (4th) viii reconsideration dismissed, S.C.C.A. No. 63, 51 O.R. (3d) 641 (2001), a 
court of appeals denied a request for declaratory relief. The Chippewa claimed land they said  they 
were the owners of despite what appeared as a sale of land to a businessman and developer with 
Crown approval in 1861, the land was never formally surrendered to the Crown.  Id. at 179, 197. 
While the court agreed that the Chippewa’s aboriginal title to the lands in question did not pass in a 
transaction not sanctioned by the Crown as required by law, it nonetheless ruled that the relief 
sought did not require the return of the land from the current possessors.  This was so even though 
the claim was not barred by any statutory limitation periods.  Id. at 213-14.  Because the Chippewa 
sought a declaration of rights, which is equitable and discretionary relief, it was subject to equitable 
defenses, including that the Chippewa did not assert a claim to the land for 150 years.  Id. at 213-14, 
215, 218, 226.  The court of appeals’ ruling did not apply these equitable rules formally, but as they 
should have relevance given sui generis characterization of aboriginal rights. In such cases, the 
court explained, the rules of the common law must be applied by analogy only.  Id. at 221.  While 
the court was mindful of the principle of legality and the rule of law that required “a priori 
consideration be given to the party whose rights have been taken, especially where the rights . . . are 
as fundamental in nature as the right of aboriginal title.”  Id.  Nonetheless, the court stated “it is a 
basic principle of [the] legal system that the right asserted by the complaining party must be 
considered in relation to the rights of others.  The complaining party cannot claim entitlement to the 
mechanical grant of an automatic remedy without regard to the consequences to the rights of others 
that might flow by reason of the complaining party’s own conduct, including . . .any delay in 
asserting the claim.”[but what “rights” do holders of void title have and but how does this affect 
federal policy]”  Id. at 221-22.  But, the court pointed out, delay alone will not defeat aboriginal 
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1.  Property Rules Converted 
The ruling in Cayuga was that the passage of time precluded the 
granting of specific relief in ejectment, but not damages. The result of 
that ruling was that a liability rule would be applied to bar specific relief 
to aboriginal title holders.  This result is against the generally accepted 
rule in every society that property rules, the right to be restored to 
possession, form the norm, and liability rules, the recovery of damages 
in lieu of possession, the critical exception.253  The nature of a liability 
rule, that an outsider can unilaterally reassign rights, runs counter to the 
reasons for protecting possession in the first place under general 
property law concepts, and as to aboriginal lands, defeats federal policy. 
While both sides in the property rule—liability rule debate have 
made arguments that at least appeal to their respective adherents, the 
debate has not been about aboriginal title.  The remedy of ejectment is 
 
claims.  Here, the equitable relief sought was denied because of the Chippewa’s conduct, in 
particular, that they had knowledge of the facts necessary to assert a claim more than a century and 
a half earlier, but delayed.  Id. at 221-22.  Also, the current possessors were good faith purchasers 
without notice and had relied on the apparent validity of the original grant from the Chippewa.  Id. 
at 224.  Yet, it was still a void, not voidable, title.  “They had no reason to believe the Chippewa had 
any claim to the land,” and had developed the property at considerable expense.  Id. at 235, 237.  
The court of appeals’ ruling may be limited to its facts and the issue of the Chippewa’s right to 
damages against the Crown for breach of its aboriginal rights by the same transaction was not 
before the court, so it made no ruling on that point.  But what result if the Chippewa had sought the 
legal remedy of ejectment?  Delgamuukw suggests that ejectment would be in order.  It seems that 
aboriginals almost always must seek a declaration of rights as a predicate for any form of relief.  
The effect, then, of the court of appeals’ decision would be to preclude ejectment in all cases, or at 
least subject such claims to equitable defenses, such as laches. 
 253 Richard A. Epstein, Symposium: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: A 
Twenty-Five Year Retrospective: A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 
106 YALE L. J. 2091, 2096 (1997).  Professor Epstein states: 
The simplest situation in the law of tort is one where A simply takes and keeps the 
property of B.  The common remedy that is allowed by all legal systems is a simple 
recovery of the thing so taken, . . . in the English law by a real action for land.  In some 
cases, a legal system does not appear to have resources to allow the specific recovery of 
the thing, so that the competence of the court is limited to an award of damages.  Even 
when the line is blurred, courts can use the calculation of damages to reinstitute a de 
facto property rule.  In the Roman law, for example, the defendant who had taken the 
plaintiff’s property was given an option to keep the thing if he were prepared to pay its 
value, which looks like a liability rule.  But what the law gave with one hand it took back 
with the other, for the value of the thing was determined by the plaintiff, who could set it 
above market value, “‘without straying over the line between optimism and perjury,’” 
[note omitted] under what we would call a self-assessment system. [note omitted].  This 
system is designed not to get an accurate measure of value, but rather to insure by 
indirection the specific recovery of the thing itself—an early preference for the property 
rules. 
Id. at 2096. 
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integral to that concept.254  Without the in rem protection that ejectment 
gives, some venture that there would be no property institution at all and 
surely no aboriginal title because aboriginal title is only possession.  
Ownership interests cannot exist without trespassory rules.255 
Besides overlooking this essential distinction in the nature of 
aboriginal compared to fee simple title, the Cayuga court also failed to 
grasp the significance of the parallel enforcement regimes: as to 
aboriginal title and title held by a sovereign, there is no statute of 
limitations or other time bar that can operate to bar an action for the 
land’s recovery, but as to fee simple title, there is.  In the former, there is 
the idea that a right that is not burdened by time bars, can never be lost 
(unless of course in the case of aboriginal title, only with the federal 
government’s permission).  That a right holder may assert a claim based 
upon that right at any time should preclude a defense of innocent or 
reasonable reliance on the appearance of title by one who must respond 
to the right holder’s claim.  In the latter regime, there is a burden on the 
right holder to act within a prescribed period of time.  The idea is that at 
some point the right may be lost, and largely by the passage of time.  
That is also the theory of laches, though a showing of some negligence 
to assert the right and harm to the other also is demanded by equity.  The 
policy in the former is to preserve the right above all, because of the 
importance of that right or other large policy.  In the latter, other specific 
societal ends such as security of title, judicial economy, and the 
productive use of land are said to justify barring the assertion of an 
ancient claim based upon a right.  Thus, to deny ejectment and its call 
for specific legal relief is the same as applying a statute of limitations, 
which cannot be done against one who is exempt.  Denying ejectment 
also permits alienation of property which federal policy has made 
inalienable in order to ensure to its holders possession in perpetuity.  By 
the infirmity of inalienability, federal law is protecting the right of 
 
 254 Honoré describes ownership by a series of “standard incidents”: 
1) the right to possess; 2) the right to use; 3) the right to manage; 4) the right to the 
income; 5) the right to the capital; 6) the right to security; 7) the incident of 
transmissibility; 8) the incident of absence of term; 9) the duty to prevent harm; 10) 
liability to execution; 11) residuary character. 
TONY HONORÈ, MAKING LAW BIND: ESSAYS LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 161-92  (1987). 
 255 See J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 126 (1996).  “The outer boundary of the 
control-powers intrinsic to various kinds of ownership interests is reciprocally related to the 
trespassory rules which protect them. [note omitted] Nevertheless, the internal content of the 
ownership interests and the internal content of the trespassory rules are mutually independent.  
These twin pillars of property institutions cannot be collapsed either one into the other.  The prima 
facie privileges and powers intrinsic to an ownership interest cannot be spelled out from the 
trespassory rules which protect it.  Id. at 129. 
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possession, not its exchange or commodity value.256 The prohibition is 
against alienation, not alienation without compensation.257  It was the 
intent of Congress that for their sustenance and as a fitting aid to their 
progress, Indian Tribes should be secure in their possession and should 
actually hold and enjoy the lands.258  Because aboriginal title gives only 
a right of possession and is incapable of alienation, denial of ejectment 
operates to extinguish the title as effectively as an act by the sovereign.  
At the same time, recognizing rights in grantees under ancient, illegal 
conveyances, largely on the basis of the passage of time, vests in these 
wrongful possessors a better title, fully alienable, in fee simple. 
Just as much as specific relief is compelled, substitutionary relief 
must be rejected, because it is inferior and unjust.  Damages will not 
enable the right holders to go out into the market and purchase new 
aboriginal land.259  In  County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and 
 
 256 Bryan, supra note 33, at 13; McNeil, supra note 94; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010. 
 257 See Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413 (1912); South Carolina v. Catawba Indian 
Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498 (1985).  There, a federal law authorized the disposal of tribal assets and 
terminated federal responsibility for the tribe and its members and it also provided that state laws 
would apply to members of the tribe in the same manner that such laws applied to non-Indians.  Id. 
at 504.  In 1980, the tribe filed an action for possession of a 225 square mile tract.  Id. at 505.  The 
state defended on the ground that the claim was barred by the state statute of limitations.  Id.  The 
Supreme Court ruled that the action was barred because the act removed the special federal services 
and statutory protections for Indians.  Id. at 510-11.  The court said, 
We have long recognized that, when Congress removes restraints on alienation by 
Indians, state laws are fully applicable to subsequent claim. . . .  These principles reflect 
an understanding that congressional action to remove restraints on alienation and other 
federal protections represents a fundamental change in federal policy with respect to the 
Indians who are the subject of the particular legislation. 
Id. at 508-09.  See also Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998) 
(deciding once lands held by Indians are freed by Congress of the burden of inalienability, it loses 
federal protection, such as from state taxation); Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 
1355 (9th Cir. 1993); relying on County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the 
Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992). 
 258 See Heckman, 224 U.S. at 413 (speaking about allotment lands). 
 259 Cass County, 524 U.S. at 103 (holding that once lands held by Indians are freed by 
Congress of the burden of inalienability, it loses federal protection, such as from state taxation); 
Lummi Indian Tribe, 5 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1993); relying on County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian 
Nation, 502 U.S. 251. There, the Lummi Indian Tribe argued that certain fee-patented reservation 
land was exempt from state taxation because it was allotted to the Tribe under a treaty rather than 
under the General Allotment Act which permits such taxation.  Lummi Indian Tribe, 5 F.3d at 1357.  
The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit held that County of Yakima was not 
dispositive, finding that the Supreme Court expressly declined to decide whether parcels patented 
under an act other than the General Allotment Act were also taxable.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that because the Court focused on the Yakima’s ability to alienate their land, rather than 
on how it was allotted, if the land is alienable, it is taxable.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the 
well-settled principle that a state may not tax reservation lands or reservation Indians unless 
Congress has “‘made its intention to [authorize state taxation] unmistakably clear.’”  Id.  The court 
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Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,260 the Supreme Court spoke of the 
correlative relationship between the prohibition on alienation of 
aboriginal lands and its liability to state law burdens. While it is within 
Congress’ power to grant Indian Tribes the power of voluntary sale, 
while at the same time giving immunity from taxation or “forced 
alienation,” such an intent by Congress would not be presumed unless it 
was “clearly manifested.”  In the Court’s view, “it would seem strange to 
withdraw [the] protection [of the restriction on alienation] and permit the 
Indian to dispose of his lands as he pleases, while at the same time 
releasing it [sic] from taxation.”261 (italics added).  Thus, while the 
protection of aboriginal title from “forced alienation,” continues, lands 
covered by that title, are not liable to state law, because to do so would 
accomplish a forced alienation.  Once alienated, aboriginal title is no 
longer aboriginal and no concepts of tracing apply.  Thus, other property 
acquired with money received from a forced alienation cannot be 
regarded as aboriginal title. Aboriginal land alienated with the 
government’s approval and then reacquired by a Tribe is forever 
alienable and so would be a Tribe’s modern land purchases held in fee 
patent status, with the consequence in both cases being liability to state 
law.262  The federal policy of maintaining Indian Tribes on their 
aboriginal lands, unless the government abandons it, therefore, means 
that no amount of monetary damages can be efficacious to remedy a 
dispossession of those lands.263 
2.  A Calculus Skewed and Equitable Rules Inverted 
Can laches be applied first to relegate a plaintiff to substitutionary 
relief, then also to discount the amount of substitutionary relief 
awarded?  If a court determines that substitutionary and not specific 
 
therefore concluded that the land’s alienability determined its taxability.  Id. at 1358.  In the Ninth 
Circuit’s view, the Supreme Court held that no matter how land becomes patented, it is taxable once 
restraints against alienation expire. Id. at 1359. 
See also 25 U.S.C. § 357 (stating that except where specifically provided for by Congress, 
aboriginal title is not subject to a state’s eminent domain power). 
 260 502 U.S. 251 (1992). 
 261 Id. at 263; see also Lummi Indian Tribe, 5 F.3d at 1357 (relying on and distinguishing 
County of Yakima). 
 262 Lummi Indian Tribe, 5 F.3d at 1358. 
 263 See United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 444-45 (1903), where the Court ruled that “[i]t 
[was] manifest that no proceedings at law [could] be . . . efficacious for the protection of the rights 
of the government, . . . and thus give security against any action upon the part of the local 
authorities tending to interfere with the complete control, not only of the Indians by the government, 
but of the property supplied to them by the government and in use on the[ir] lands.”  Id. 
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relief is in order because equitable considerations preclude the latter, but 
not the former, do those same equitable considerations operate to limit 
the amount of substitutionary relief awarded?  This occurred in Cayuga.  
The jury awarded damages for “loss of use and possession of the [land] 
from July 27, 1795 to date as measured by a fair rental value without 
improvements” of $1.9 million.264  The court added $35 million for the 
future loss of use and possession (permanent damages) and $211 million 
as prejudgment interest.265  The fair rental value damages were 
computed for each of the 204 years in the year those damages were 
sustained and the jury did not, as instructed by the court, convert those 
damages to current values.266  The jury took  $3.5 million, or 10% of 
what it deemed to be the current value of the property ($35 million) and 
divided that by each of the 204 years.267  That calculation seemed 
completely arbitrary and had the effect of overstating the compensation 
in the early years and understating it in the later years because rental 
values surely could not have remained constant for more than 200 
years.268  The court accepted the verdict nonetheless, pointing out the 
difference between a verdict that is logical and one that might be 
economically consistent, the latter being an insufficient ground for 
overturning a verdict. 
The court held that an award of prejudgment interest was clearly 
appropriate and necessary to fully compensate the Cayuga for the lost 
“opportunity” cost, or time value of money, resulting from not having 
the stream of rental income available to them from the property over the 
past two centuries.269  Such an award is also favored by general 
 
 264 Cayuga, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 274. 
 265 Id. at 292.  The United States’ expert had suggested $335 million as compensation and the 
State’s expert $40 million to $62 million.  Id. at 288. 
 266 Id. at 283. 
 267 Id. at 283. 
 268 Id. at 284. 
 269 The court awarded pre-judgment interest even though the Cayuga’s did not expressly seek 
it.  Cayuga, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 284.  But under federal common law, that omission does not amount 
to a waiver of the right to such and award.  Id. at 284.  This position is “consistent with both Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 15(b), freely allowing amendment to complaints . . . and . . . Rule 54 (c), allowing for the 
granting of such relief in a default judgment as a party is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in the party’s pleadings.”  Id.  The district court found the guiding legal 
principles for awarding pre-judgment interest in Wickham Contracting v. Local Union No.3, 955 
F.2d 831, 834 (2d Cir. 1992): “(i) the need to fully compensate the wronged party for actual 
damages suffered, (ii) considerations of fairness and the relative equities of the award, (iii) the 
remedial purpose of the statute involved, and/or [for] (iv) such other general principles as are 
deemed relevant by the court,” which include the certainty of the damages due the plaintiff and 
whether the statute itself already provides for full compensation and punitive damages.  In addition, 
the “speculative nature of the damages in question will always be relevant to a sound decision on a 
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considerations of fairness and the relative equities.  But the amount of an 
award would be limited in the same way the available relief was limited.  
Even though the court could not fault the Cayuga for delay in bringing 
the action (as it did in deciding to preclude specific relief) because of the 
legal and political obstacles they faced,270 the court said it could not 
ignore the passage of more that 200 years in calculating prejudgment 
interest.271  Though the accrual date was determined to be July 27, 1795, 
as the “date of injury or deprivation.”272  Nevertheless the court held that 
considerations of fairness and equity to the state defendant, who the 
court could not find had acted in perfect good faith,273 required that 
interest not be computed from that date.  Instead, the amount of interest 
otherwise accruing was discounted by some 90%.274 
The original idea of equity was specific and in personam relief 
where none could be found at law.  Examples of such relief include 
specific performance of a contract for the sale for land, rescission of a 
contract, injunctions against threatened injurious conduct.  The Cayuga 
court stated that ejectment was “not an adequate remedy relative to other 
available remedies, most notably monetary damages,”275 thereby turning 
 
consideration of whether prejudgment interest should be awarded.”  Wickham Contracting, 955 F.2d 
at 836.  The district court found prejudgment interest can be awarded even when a federal statute is 
silent on the issue, as is the Nonintercourse Act, so long as such awards are “fair, equitable and 
necessary to compensates the wronged party fully.”  Cayuga, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 285.  At the same 
time, where “the defendant acted innocently and had no reason to know of the wrongfulness of his 
action . . . when there is a good faith dispute between the parties as to the existence of any liability, 
or . . . when the plaintiff is responsible for the delay in recovery,” prejudgment interest may be 
denied.  Id. at 285.  See generally, Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001). 
 270 Cayuga, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 353. 
 271 The court used compounded interest, due to the fact this furthered the primary goal of 
prejudgment interest, which is to make the plaintiff whole again and compounding the interest was 
the norm from a strictly economic perspective.  Id. at 363.  The court adopted a rate of one of the 
economists who testified (Berkman) who used “the 3-month Treasury Bill” rate for most of the 
century and during the 1800’s, used various municipal, state, and federal bonds, and between 1795 
and 1797, he used the rate “associated with a loan from Holland to the American Revolutionary 
government.”  Id.  These rates took into account changing economic conditions and therefore best 
composted with the purpose of a prejudgment interest award. Id. 
 272 Id. at 363. 
 273 The court found that considering the sales price set for Cayuga land, “the State’s lack of 
good faith [to be] virtually self-evident. . . .”  Id. at 347.  The state purchased lands for “what was 
the equivalent of only 50 cents per acre, whereas those lands were to be sold by the state for no less 
than the equivalent of $2.00 per acre.”  Id.  While the court did not find that the state was motivated 
by a deliberate intent to cheat or defraud the Cayuga, “[t]here [was] more than enough proof in the 
record, . . . to support a finding . . . that the State . . . did exhibit a lack of good faith in its dealings 
with the Cayuga.”  Id. at 349. 
 274 Id. at 366. 
 275 Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10579 at *81 (N.D.N.Y. 1999), 
citing Restatement § 937, cmt. b (“For property rights . . . , a damage award may often provide 
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the analysis upside down (particularly where the Cayuga did not seek 
equitable relief).  The first point to make about this is that 
substitutionary relief theoretically is inadequate, at least to the extent 
that damages are not equivalent to the thing lost.  Additionally, the 
particular award is unjust because it reflects a double penalty as the right 
holders are denied possession because of delay, though their claim is not 
barred by law, but they are also denied a full substitute because of that 
same delay. 
There is the further point that ejectment and damages serve 
different ends: the former, the interest in the land per se, and the latter, 
the interest in the economic value of the land. Where the thing for which 
relief is sought has no commodity or exchange value, such as land 
covered by aboriginal title, an award of monetary damages in 
substitution for specific relief cannot be accepted as just. Moreover, in 
the culture of indigenous peoples, 
[T]he collective right to land means that land has a value beyond being 
a commodity that is to be purchased and exchanged.  The broader 
value of land remains central to the lives and economies. Everything of 
consequence for indigenous peoples begins with their unique 
understanding of the ties between all life, the land and the seas.  It is a 
‘symbiotic relationship,’ a physical and spiritual unity, a seamless 
whole which [cannot] be divided into parts.276 
It is the lack of any specific interchangeability among things within 
the indigenous peoples’ culture that demonstrates a categorization of 
fungibility to goods that Westerners would not recognize, “which would 
also imply that the procurement of goods for consumption is not 
necessarily based on the technological production of them but is rather 
related to the specific tree or fish or river or moose that is in front of 
them, and for reasons that would not make sense to us. . . .”277 Only 
specific relief gives indigenous peoples their due of “legal protection to 
prior occupation in the present-day.”278 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
“Property” both confers and was born of power.  It bestows on an 
owner a form of sovereignty over others, because the sovereign state 
 
adequate substitutional relief.”) [But this is entirely different—the opposite—from what the court 
found.] 
 276 VENNE, supra note 78, at 126. 
 277 Bryan, supra note 33, at 27-28. 
 278 Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1088. 
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stands behind the owner’s assertion of right.  Individual property rights 
thus depend on state power and when the state recognizes and enforces 
one person’s property right, it simultaneously denies property rights in 
others.  A property owner’s security as to particular things thus comes at 
the expense of others being vulnerable to the owner’s control over those 
things.  “Ownership, therefore, is power over persons, not merely 
things.”279  Conversely, where the state does not back ownership, there 
can be no property or individual sovereignty.  Individual sovereignty 
both assures and rests upon self-determination, a human right and also a 
political one.280 Self-government is a vital political aspect of the right of 
self-determination.281 
The sovereignty of indigenous peoples as it rests upon aboriginal 
title, though, is not a true sovereignty, because the federal government 
holds the power to extinguish that title.  But would the government 
move to do so in the case of the Cayuga, the Seneca, and the Miami 
where specific relief in ancient ejectment claims cannot fairly be denied? 
An honest assessment of the historical circumstances upon which 
indigenous peoples came to be dispossessed (as the High Court in 
Australia in particular has done) demands that the government not do so.  
Instead, any deprivation of that possession, even ancient ones, must be 
limited to a discussion of restoring indigenous peoples to their lands. 
 
 279 Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property  In The American Republican Legal Culture, 66 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 277 (1991). 
 280 See Paul Joffee, Assessing the Delgamuukw Principles, 45 MCGILL L.J. 155, 182-83, 203 
(2000).  The Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed in the Quebec Secession Reference, [1988] 2 
S.C.R. 217, that the right of self-determination ‘has developed largely as a human right.’” 
 281 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: 
1.  All peoples have the right of self-determination.  By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development. 
2.  All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-
operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law.  In no case 
may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.” 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (xxI), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Art. 
1, (Dec. 19, 1966) Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force March 23, 1976, 
accession by Canada May 19, 1976). 
Part 1, Article 1.  The Committee also recommended that the practice of extinguishing inherent 
aboriginal rights be abandoned as incompatible with article 1 of the Covenant.  With particular 
reference to Canada in 1999, the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations has stated that it 
was particularly concerned that Canada had not yet implemented the recommendations of the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, which concluded, among other things, that without a greater 
share of lands and resources, institutions of aboriginal self-government would fail.  U. N. CCPR 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Committee, 65th Canada, 
[Part] C, at ¶8.  UN Committee on Human Rights, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 105 at para. 8 (1999). 
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As land is restored to indigenous peoples and title is confirmed in 
these claimants, is it to be restored with the same burdens and limitations 
that in modern life affect non-aboriginal title?  In some places, the land 
sought and restored are in areas thought by some to be ecologically 
sensitive, fragile.282  But this concern cannot be grounds for refusing to 
restore aboriginal lands. Tribal lands may be subject to some state land 
use regulations,283 yet importantly, because aboriginal title’s defining 
characteristic is the right of possession, in perpetuity, it provides the 
foundation for the preservation of the distinct culture on which that title 
is founded. But, if the specific relief of ejectment is to be denied, despite 
a compelling case under law for it, the only just and principled 
substitutionary relief for these ancient claims is substitute aboriginal 
land. That is to say, land denominated sovereign and free from the 
burdens of state. 
 
 282 Dave Cunningham, “Race-based riches: A study finds the Nisga’a template will give 
indians one-fifth of BC’s timber,” CANADIAN BUSINESS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS, BRITISH 
COLUMBIA REPORT, Oct. 5, 1998, available at http://www.lexis.com.  Concerns about 
environmentally threatening uses were raised after the making of the Nisga’a treaty.  Id.  One 
journal reported on the results of a study showing that “if the Nisga’a treaty is used as a template for 
the 50 other treaties under negotiation, it would darken B.C.’s [British Columbia’s] economic 
climate dramatically and give 3% of the province’s population 20% of its timber.”  Id.  Under the 
treaty, the Nisga’a have title to “1,930 square kilometres of . . . land[] including a timber base able 
to sustain an annual allowable cut (AAC) of 165,000 cubic metres for the first five years, dropping 
to 135,000 cubic metres thereafter.”  Id.  In addition, Nisga’a have the “right to “‘co-manage’ the 
1.6-million-hectare Nass Wildlife Area, roughly eight times the size of their settlement lands.  This 
includes a 50% vote in all land-use decisions that may affect fish and wildlife—in particular, 
logging, mining and hunting.”  Id.  An additional 165,000 cubic metres of timber in the Nass 
Timber Supply Area, means (according to one analyst), [“the total Nisga’a [annual allowable cut] 
could easily top 500,000 cubic metres, taken primarily from licences now held by government-
owned Skeena Cellulose.  Given a Nisga’a population of 5,500, 3.7% of B.C.’s Indian population, a 
quick calculation suggests that if the treaty is used as a template, B.C. Indians will have harvesting 
rights of 13.5 million cubic metres, 19% of the total provincial crown forest [annual allowable 
cut].”]  Id.  “A similar extrapolation of Nisga’a wildlife management rights indicates B.C. Indians 
will control and co-manage 49 million hectares-one-half of the entire province.”  Id.  “‘Every timber 
licence renewal, cut-block permit, access road, harvesting system, silviculture regime and habitat 
treatment in the Nass Wildlife Area will require the approval of Indian co-managers.’”  Id. 
 283 United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).  The Court stated [in dicta] that a state 
could regulate Native American fishing rights for conservation purposes.  Id.  That dicta became the 
holding in Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942).  There, the State of Washington charged and 
convicted a Yakima Indian of netting salmon off the reservation without a fishing license.  Id. at 
682.  The defendant argued that the licensing requirement violated the Indians’ fishing rights under 
treaty.  Id.  The Court ruled that the state could regulate the “time and manner of fishing outside the 
reservation as . . . necessary for the conservation of fish.”  Id. at 684.  The state could not, however, 
charge a fee for the license, since it was “not indispensable to the effectiveness of a state 
conservation program,” but it impermissibly limited a federal right.  Id. at 685; see also Puyallup 
Tribe v. Washington, 391 U.S. 392 (1968); Washington v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973); 
Puyallup v. Washington, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (all three decisions upholding state’s reasonable 
regulations to the extent necessary for conservation). 
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